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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the efficiency  of household investment decisions in a unique dataset
containing the disaggregated wealth and income of the entire population of Sweden. The analysis
focuses on two main sources of inefficiency in the financial portfolio: underdiversification of risky
assets (“down”) and nonparticipation in risky asset markets (“out”). We find that while a few
households are very poorly diversified, the cost of diversification mistakes is quite modest for most
of the population. For instance, a majority of participating Swedish households are sufficiently
diversified internationally to outperform the Sharpe ratio of their domestic stock market. We
document that households with greater financial sophistication tend to invest more efficiently but
also more aggressively, so the welfare cost of portfolio inefficiency tends to be greater for these
households. The welfare cost of nonparticipation is smaller by almost one half when we take account
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Modern ﬁnancial markets oﬀer a rich array of investment opportunities. Households
in developed countries can accumulate liquid wealth in bank accounts, money market
funds, bond funds, equity mutual funds, individual bonds and equities, ﬁnancial prod-
ucts with insurance features such as annuities and capital insurance funds, and derivative
securities. In addition, many households have signiﬁcant wealth in less liquid forms
such as real estate and private businesses.
How do households exploit these investment opportunities? Do they typically follow
the precepts of standard ﬁnancial theory such as participation (taking at least small
amounts of compensated risk) and diversiﬁcation (avoiding uncompensated risk)? To
the extent that they deviate from these precepts, are the costs of such deviation modest,
and therefore explicable by relatively small frictions ignored in standard theory, or are
they large and accordingly hard to rationalize? How heterogeneous are household
investment strategies? Are cross-sectional diﬀerences in investment strategies correlated
with observable household characteristics such as age, education, and wealth?
These questions are of central importance in economics and ﬁnance, but reliable
answers are extremely hard to obtain because they require a high-quality dataset on
investment strategies. To study household portfolios, we would like to have data with
at least ﬁve characteristics. First, the data should include a representative sample
of the population. Second, for each household, the data should measure both total
wealth and an exhaustive breakdown of wealth into relevant categories. Third, these
categories should be detailed enough to distinguish between asset classes, and for some
issues–notably the question of diversiﬁcation–we would like to observe holdings of
individual assets. Fourth, the data must be accurately reported. Finally, we would
like to follow households over time so we would like to have panel data rather than
repeated cross-sections.
Most work on household portfolio choice relies on surveys. The US survey with
the best data on ﬁnancial wealth is generally thought to be the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF).1 The SCF is representative and measures all components of wealth,
but it reports holdings of broad asset classes rather than speciﬁc ﬁnancial assets, it relies
on the accuracy of household ﬁnancial reporting, and it does not follow households over
time. Accordingly there has recently been interest in alternative data sources that
1Recent studies that use the SCF include Bergstresser and Poterba (2004), Bertaut and Starr-
McCluer (2002), Carroll (2002), Heaton and Lucas (2000), Poterba and Samwick (1997), Tracy and
Schneider (2001), and Tracy, Schneider and Chan (1999). Other surveys of wealth are the Wharton
Survey conducted in the 1970’s (Blume and Friend 1978) and the UBS/Gallup survey (Graham, Harvey,
and Huang 2005 and Vissing-Jorgensen 2003), both of which rely on telephone interviews, and the Health
and Retirement Survey (Juster, Smith, and Staﬀord 1999) which has high quality data but only on older
households.
2remedy these deﬁciencies. Following the pioneering work of Schlarbaum, Lewellen,
and Lease (1978) and Odean (1998, 1999), a number of authors have looked at the
account records of individual investors reported by a brokerage house.2 These brokerage
records are highly accurate reports of holdings and trades in individual stocks, but they
sample customers of the brokerage house rather than the entire population and do
not necessarily represent total wealth even of these customers, who may also have other
accounts elsewhere. Similar diﬃculties aﬄict recent studies of asset allocation in 401(k)
accounts and other tax-favored retirement accounts.3
Government tax records are a tried-and-true source of accurate ﬁnancial data. The
US tax system requires reporting of wealth only in connection with the estate tax, which
is levied only on the holdings of the very rich at the date of death. Blume and Friend
(1978) and Kopczuk and Saez (2004) have used US estate tax records to study household
asset allocation. In Sweden, by contrast, households are liable to pay a wealth tax
throughout their lives, and this has led the Swedish government to construct detailed
records of households’ ﬁnancial assets. In this paper we use Swedish government records
to construct a panel of wealth and income data covering the entire population of Sweden
(about 9 million residents). The dataset provides highly disaggregated information on
the income, wealth, demographic composition, education and location of all households.
Individual ﬁnancial asset, mutual fund and real estate portfolios are provided at the
single property and security level. Each individual can be followed over time. The
i n c o m ed a t ab e g i ni n1 9 8 3a n dt h ew e a l t hd a t ai n1 9 9 9 . O u rd a t a s e tg i v e su st h e
unique opportunity to analyze the ﬁnancial behavior of the entire population of an
industrialized country.
There is some earlier work by Massa and Simonov (2003) on the portfolios of Swedish
households. Massa and Simonov do not make direct use of Swedish government records.
Instead, they begin with an income and wealth survey, Longitudinal Individual Data for
Sweden (LINDA), which describes a representative sample of about 3% of the Swedish
population. LINDA contains high-quality data on income, real estate, and overall
taxable wealth, but gives limited information about the components of ﬁnancial wealth.
Only the share of each household’s wealth invested in risky assets and its bank account
balance are available. Massa and Simonov merge LINDA with a dataset on individual
stock ownership of Swedish companies from 1995 to 2000. Stock ownership data were
available in this period since Swedish companies were legally required to report the
identity of most of their shareholders. These reporting requirements did not apply to
2Recent papers using brokerage house data include Barber and Odean (2001), Zhu (2002), Goetzmann
and Kumar (2004), Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2003), and Ivkovic, Sialm, and Weisbenner (2004).
3Recent studies of such accounts include Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden (2003), Ameriks and Zeldes
(2004), Benartzi and Thaler (2001), Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2002, 2004), and Madrian
and Shea (2001).
3mutual funds or to bond issuers, and thus Massa and Simonov cannot measure bond or
mutual fund holdings. Their dataset, like the brokerage records used by Odean (1998,
1999), can be used to measure biases in households’ decisions with respect to individual
stocks, but not the overall degree of diversiﬁcation in household portfolios.
We estimate the means and variances of household portfolio returns using standard
asset pricing models, and obtain four main sets of results. First, a large fraction of
households incurs modest diversiﬁcation losses in their ﬁnancial portfolios of mutual
funds, stocks and cash. This result is robust to the choice of asset pricing models or
diversiﬁcation measures. Earlier researchers such as Blume and Friend (1975), Kelly
(1995), and Goetzmann and Kumar (2004) have found that households own severely
underdiversiﬁed portfolios of individual stocks; but we show that mutual funds and cash
dominate direct stockholdings in many household portfolios and thus play a crucial role
in explaining low diversiﬁcation losses. A majority of participating households actually
outperform the Sharpe ratio of their domestic market, which can be explained by the
substantial share of international securities in popular mutual funds.
Second, households with greater ﬁnancial sophistication, as measured for instance
by wealth or education, tend to invest more eﬃciently but also more aggressively. More
speciﬁcally, the ﬁnancial portfolios of sophisticated households have higher Sharpe ratios
but also higher volatility. As a result, sophistication generally has an ambiguous eﬀect
on the average return loss. In Sweden, we ﬁnd that the cost of underdiversiﬁcation is
larger for more sophisticated households.
Third, the paper conﬁrms earlier empirical ﬁndings on individual portfolios in a
highly reliable and comprehensive dataset. We thus report that Swedish households
exposed to more background risk, such as entrepreneurs (Heaton and Lucas 2000) or
large families, tend to invest less aggressively and more eﬃciently. Similarly, our ﬁnding
that richer households attain higher Sharpe ratios seems consistent with earlier research
documenting a positive link between rationality and wealth (Vissing-Jorgensen 2003).
Fourth, we verify that variables traditionally associated with nonparticipation, such
as low education and low wealth, also tend to characterize poor diversiﬁcation. This
result suggests that nonparticipating households would probably invest poorly if they
entered risky asset markets. We show that the welfare costs of nonparticipation are
lower by almost one half when underdiversiﬁcation costs are taken into account. Agents
who are “out” would likely be “down” if they entered ﬁnancial markets.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the data. In Section
3, we describe asset allocation at the aggregate and household levels and ask what char-
acteristics make a household more likely to participate in risky asset markets. Section
4 investigates the diversiﬁcation of Swedish household portfolios, using a mean-variance
framework. Section 5 relates portfolio eﬃciency to household characteristics and de-
rives implications for the welfare cost of nonparticipation. Section 6 asks how investment
4behavior has changed over time, and Section 7 concludes. An Appendix describes our
methods in detail.
2. Data Summary
We begin the presentation of the dataset with a brief description of the Swedish economy
and tax system. Sweden is an industrialized nation with a population of 9 million. The
GDP per capita in 2002 is estimated at $27,300 when currencies are converted at PPP;
this is slightly higher than the EU average of $26,000. A large fraction of GDP is
controlled by the Swedish government. Total tax revenue amounted to 56% of GDP
in 2002. Government expenditure includes transfers (25% of GDP in 2002), operating
expenses (28%) and investment (3%). Because of the large scale of government transfers,
Sweden is characterized by a large middle class and lower inequality in disposable income
than most other industrialized nations.
Swedish households are subject to both a capital income tax and a wealth tax.
Capital income (interest, dividends and capital gains) is taxed at a ﬂat rate of 30%, with
deductions allowed for interest paid and capital losses. The wealth tax is paid on all the
assets of the household, including real estate and ﬁnancial securities, with the important
exception of private businesses.4 It is levied at a rate of 1.5% on taxable wealth above
a threshold, which was equal to 2,000,000 Swedish kronas (SEK) for married couples
and 1,500,000 SEK for single taxpayers in 2002. The Swedish krona traded at $0.1127
at the end of 2002, so these thresholds correspond to $225,000 for married couples and
$170,000 for single taxpayers. In 2002, 263,000 individuals paid $430 million between
them in wealth tax. We refer the reader to T a x e si nS w e d e n2 0 0 4for further details.
Because of the existence of the wealth tax, the government’s statistical agency, Sta-
tistics Sweden (also known by its Swedish acronym SCB), has a parliamentary mandate
to collect household-level data on wealth. Statistics Sweden compiles information on
household ﬁnances from a variety of sources, including the Swedish Tax Agency, welfare
agencies, and the private sector. Financial institutions supply information to the tax
agency on their customers’ deposits, interest paid or received, security investments and
dividends. Employers similarly supply statements of wages paid to their employees. In
April, taxpayers receive a tax return on which all the data supplied by employers and
ﬁnancial institutions has already been entered by the tax agency. The taxpayer checks
the ﬁgures and, if necessary, corrects errors and adds information or claims for deduc-
tions. Of the 7 million individual taxpayers who submitted income returns in 2003, 49%
4More precisely, taxable wealth is calculated as 100% of the value of bank accounts paying interest
above 100 SEK per year, bonds and ﬁxed-income mutual funds, capital insurance products, residential
real estate, and cars and boats exceeding 10,000 SEK in value, plus 80% of the value of A-list Swedish
stocks, comparable foreign stocks, and equity mutual funds.
5just signed and returned the form, while another 51% changed or added information.5
We compiled the data supplied by Statistics Sweden into a panel covering four
years (1999-2002) and the entire population of Sweden (about 9 million residents). The
information available on each resident can be grouped into three main categories: 1)
demographic characteristics; 2) disaggregated wealth portfolio; and 3) disaggregated
income. We successively review these categories.
Demographic information includes age, gender, marital status, nationality, birth-
place, education, and place of residence, as well as household composition and identi-
ﬁcation number. The household identiﬁcation number allows us to group residents by
living units and thus investigate ﬁnances at the family level. There are about 4.8 mil-
lion households in Sweden during our sample period. Geographical data are coded with
six digits that represent county, municipality, and parish; there are over 2200 separate
parishes in the dataset.
The panel contains highly disaggregated wealth information, which lists the world-
wide assets owned by the resident at the end of a tax year. All ﬁnancial assets must
be reported, including bank accounts, mutual funds and stocks. The information is
provided for each individual account or each security referenced by its International
Security Identiﬁcation Number (ISIN). The database also records contributions made
during the year to private pension savings, as well as debt outstanding at year end and
interest paid during the year.
Income is reported both at the aggregate level and by individual source. For capital
income, the database reports for each bank account or each security the income (in-
terest, dividends) that has been earned and the sales that have taken place (number
and price of sold securities) during the year. However the database does not report
the exact date of a sale nor information on asset purchases. For labor income, the
database reports gross labor income and business sector. The database also reports
public and private pension income, military service compensation, and a detailed list of
welfare transfers, including unemployment beneﬁts, workers’ compensation, paternity
and maternity allowance, student allowance, housing allowance, and disability support.
We believe our data to be of unusually high quality as the information comes directly
from Swedish ﬁrms, ﬁnancial institutions and state agencies. The entire population is
observed, so selection bias is not a problem. We acknowledge, however, four possible
weaknesses in our dataset. First, we do not observe the value of households’ deﬁned
contribution pension savings. These include assets in private pension plans and in the
so-called premium portion of the public pension system. Second, we observe the total
value of capital insurance products, a form of tax-favored saving, but we do not observe
5All tax returns are ﬁled individually in Sweden, as the tax code does not allow the possibility of joint
ﬁling. When an asset is owned jointly, each household member is assigned for tax purposes a percentage
of its value, which is reported in the dataset.
6the allocation of these assets. We have made several alternative assumptions about
asset allocation in capital insurance and ﬁnd that our results are robust to any of these
assumptions. Third, bank accounts need not be reported to the Swedish Tax Agency
unless they receive more than 100 SEK (or $11) in interest during the year. We will
discuss several imputation methods to address this problem of missing bank account
data. Finally, there is the issue of tax evasion, which is probably more acute for wealthy
households that own international assets.6
Sections 3-5 of the paper consist of a cross-sectional analysis for a random sample
of 100,000 households, or slightly more than 2% of the Swedish population, at the
end of 2002. This choice is motivated by computational convenience, and robustness
checks conﬁrm that our results are unaﬀected by changing the random subsample. We
expect that econometric work based on the entire population would reduce the standard
errors in our cross-sectional regressions by a factor of roughly seven. In Section 6, we
investigate the behavior of the same households at the end of 1999 in order to explore
possible changes in household behavior over time.
3. Household Asset Allocation
The goal of this section is to describe the asset allocation decisions of Swedish house-
holds. We begin by summarizing the aggregate properties of our sample, comparing
them with other sources of aggregate data for Sweden. Then we examine household
asset allocation and participation in the cross-section.
3.1. Aggregate Statistics
We report in Table 1 the aggregate wealth of households in our dataset and its break-
down into main asset categories at the end of 2002. Speciﬁcally, we compute gross
wealth as the nominal value of ﬁnancial and real estate assets held by the household.
Aggregate gross wealth is approximately 479 billion dollars for the households in our
6We can cross-check the accuracy of foreign holdings in our dataset by comparing the cumulative sum
of aggregate investment ﬂows over a long time period. Since 1979, Statistics Sweden has reported two
diﬀerent measures of aggregate household investment: 1) the diﬀerence between aggregate disposable
income and aggregate consumption (imputed from payroll, sales, tax and transfer data supplied by ﬁrms
and government agencies); 2) the aggregate investment of individuals (reported by ﬁnancial institutions).
The cumulated diﬀerence between the ﬁrst and the second estimates over the 1979-2002 period represents
about 6.2% of the aggregate assets owned by households at the end of 2002 (see www.scb.se). The
discrepancy is caused by a variety of items: a) the consumption of Swedish travelers in foreign countries;
b) capital gains and c) unreported foreign investment. This analysis suggests that unreported foreign
investments represent a modest fraction of household assets. This problem is probably only acute for
the very rich, given the ﬁxed costs associated with illegal foreign investments.
7dataset. On a per household basis, we estimate gross wealth at about $98,000, debt at
$30,000, and therefore net wealth at $68,000.
Financial wealth represents 27.5% of gross wealth, or about $27,000 per household,
while real estate accounts for the remaining 72.5%. Financial wealth is decomposed
into its main components: bank accounts, money market funds, mutual funds, stocks,
capital insurance, and other assets (bonds and derivatives). Capital insurance is a form
of investment subjected to a special tax treatment by the Swedish Tax Authority. It
exists in two forms: unit link or traditional. Unit link savings are invested in mutual
funds. Traditional insurance products guarantee a minimum ﬁxed return, which could
not exceed between 1999 and 2002 the 3% limit set by the Finance Inspection Board
(Finansinspektionen).7
Cash, which consists of holdings in bank accounts and money market funds, repre-
sents 41% of ﬁnancial wealth. Mutual funds and capital insurance account for 31%, and
individual securities (stocks, bonds and derivatives) for the remaining 28%.
Individual stockholdings have a market value of 29.8 billion dollars in our dataset,
and primarily consist of domestic equity (27.5 billion dollars). Since Swedish stock mar-
kets had a market capitalization of 201.4 billion dollars at the end of 2002,8 the domestic
investors in our dataset owned individually about 13.7% of Swedish stocks, a ﬁgure con-
sistent with the 14.4% estimate reported by the Swedish central bank.9 Foreign stocks
play a minor role with aggregate holdings of about 2.3 billion dollars. This ﬁnding is
consistent with the relatively high cost of trading individual foreign stocks.
International diversiﬁcation, however, is readily available to Swedish investors in the
form of mutual funds. Swedish ﬁnancial institutions have long recognized the impor-
tance of international diversiﬁcation and routinely oﬀer their customers a wide range
of corresponding products. Some of these consist of international funds managed by
domestic institutions, such as the Robur Bank’s Euro Equity, or by leading Ameri-
7The taxation of capital insurance is based on the Statslåneränta, which is deﬁned as the average mar-
ket interest rate on Swedish government bonds with a remaining maturity of at least ﬁve years. Swedish
authorities use the Statslåneränta as a proxy for the long-run nominal interest rate. Capital insurance
accounts are subjected to a ﬂat tax on their market value, whose rate is 27% of the Statslåneränta.I n
2002, this corresponded to a tax on market value that was slightly higher than 1%.
8The main stockmarket is the Stockholm Stock Exchange (OMX), which had a market capitalization
of 200.6 billion dollars at the end of 2002. Other markets include the Nya Marknaden (0.4 billion dollars),
the Equities Market Place (0.1 billion dollars), and the Nordic Growth Market (0.3 billion dollars).
9In Table 1, domestic equity consists of all the publicly traded companies that are registered in
Sweden. This deﬁnition excludes transnational companies, such as ABB or Astra Zeneca, which have
important operations in Sweden, are traded in Swedish stockmarkets, and are included in the domestic
indexes. When these companies are included in the deﬁnition of domestic equity, household direct
investments in domestic stocks have an aggregate value of 263.9 billion SEK at the end of 2002, which
represents 14.8% of Swedish stocks. The Central Bank estimate of direct domestic stockholdings (14.4%)
is thus contained between the low (13.7%) and high (14.8%) estimates from our dataset.
8can companies such as Fidelity, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan or Merrill Lynch. These
products are available at low cost and thus make it possible for middle-class Swedish
households to achieve a good level of international diversiﬁcation. We will investigate
in Section 4 whether households take advantage of these opportunities.
Table 1 also includes the wealth statistics computed by Statistics Sweden (SCB).
Our dataset matches these oﬃcial statistics remarkably well. Statistics Sweden reports
aggregate ﬁnancial wealth equal to 1,165 billion SEK, which is very close to the 1,168.5
billion SEK in our sample. The aggregate estimates are also quite close for each cat-
egory of assets. The main diﬀerences are for mutual funds and money market funds.
We attribute this discrepancy to slightly diﬀerent fund classiﬁcations. The aggregated
holdings in both types of funds are 320 billion SEK with the SCB data, and 324.5 billion
SEK with our data.10 Our dataset thus has good aggregation properties, which conﬁrms
its reliability and accuracy.
3.2. Asset Allocation in the Cross-Section
Aggregate statistics tell us how the average dollar of wealth is allocated. This can
be quite diﬀerent from the asset allocation of the average household, however, because
the wealthy invest diﬀerently from poorer households (Tracy, Schneider and Chan 1999,
Heaton and Lucas 2000, Carroll 2002). A detailed microeconomic analysis is required
to obtain a good picture of investment patterns at the household level.
A good starting point is to plot the distribution of wealth in the population. Figure
1 reports the average value of gross and net wealth in diﬀerent parts of the gross wealth
distribution. The bottom 20% of households have almost no measured wealth (recall
that small bank accounts are not recorded in our dataset), and so we omit them from
the ﬁgure. The three lines in the ﬁgure represent gross wealth, ﬁnancial assets, and
net wealth. The lines diverge substantially for households in the middle of the wealth
distribution, reﬂecting the fact that these households have a large fraction of their gross
wealth in housing, and have correspondingly large mortgage debt. Sweden is a relatively
egalitarian society by international standards, but even so wealthy households at the
right of the ﬁgure have a disproportionate impact on aggregate asset allocation.11
In order to better assess the ﬁnancial decisions of poorer households, we need to
correct for the missing observation of some small bank accounts. In the rest of the
10We characterize a fund as money market if the standard deviation of its returns is less than 0.35%
per year. This cutoﬀ corresponds to a substantial gap in the distribution of historical standard deviations
and a shift in the names of the funds.
11W ec a na l s os e eS w e d i s hr e d i s t r i b u t i o ni na c t i o nb yc o m p a r i n gi n e q u a l i t yi ng r o s si n c o m e( b e f o r e
taxes and transfers) with inequality in disposable income. For 2002, we obtain G =3 5 .0% for gross
income and G =2 7 .1% for disposable income. The value obtained for disposable income is consistent
with the value G =2 5 .8% obtained by Statistics Sweden. These Gini coeﬃcients are low by international
standards.
9paper, we impute the balance of a bank account as a function of observable household
characteristics, including ﬁnancial wealth and education. The Appendix contains a full
discussion of this methodology. Extensive checks show that our results are very robust
to the choice (or absence) of imputation method.
Figure 2 illustrates the cross-sectional variation in the ﬁnancial and real estate port-
folio at the end of 2002. Panel A shows how portfolio composition varies with wealth.
We subdivide households into wealth percentiles, and compute the average portfolio
held by the members of each wealth group. Households in the lowest two deciles are
not shown in the ﬁgure, because their total wealth is poorly measured and they hold al-
most nothing but cash. In the third and fourth deciles, households accumulate ﬁnancial
wealth in the form of cash, mutual funds, individual stocks and other ﬁnancial assets.
The share of real estate investments grows quickly with wealth for deciles in the middle
of the wealth distribution. Households in the ﬁfth to ninth percentile have about 60 to
80 percent of gross wealth invested in real estate and few risky ﬁnancial assets. The
share of real estate declines for households in the highest decile, while the share of risky
ﬁnancial assets rises quite substantially. The wealth composition of Swedish households
is thus consistent with results reported for other industrialized countries such as the
United States (Tracy, Schneider and Chan 1999, Bertaut and Starr-McCluer 2002).
In Panel B, we illustrate the variation of wealth composition with the age of the
household head.12 The share of real estate rises for young households, peaks at 80%
at the age of 40, and then falls to about 50% for senior households. The share of
mutual funds is stable around 10%. The share of individual stocks is also relatively
constant around 6%, with slightly higher values for households in the younger age groups
a n di nt h e i rﬁfties. The fraction of cash holdings is minimal for the middle-aged. It is
presumably higher for young households who are saving to purchase their ﬁrst home.
The elderly tend to dissave, and their nominal cash holdings probably decrease less
quickly than their other investments.
Thus in Sweden as in many other countries, there are four main groups of households:
(1) households whose only savings are in the form of cash; (2) households who are saving
for housing and are investing part of their wealth in mutual funds and stocks; (3) people
with housing and few ﬁnancial assets; and (4) households with large ﬁnancial wealth.
Figure 3 illustrates cross-section variation in the ﬁnancial portfolio, which of course
excludes real estate. Figure 3A shows how the composition of the ﬁnancial portfolio
varies with gross wealth. The shares of all risky assets increase quickly between the 20th
and 30th percentile, and then become relatively stable until the 90th percentile. Mutual
funds represent the largest fraction of risky assets held by households in this region of the
wealth distribution. In the highest decile, however, direct stockholdings have a quickly
increasing share and end up representing more than half of ﬁnancial wealth. Thus while
12The household head is the member with the largest disposable income.
10stocks and mutual funds represent comparable fractions of aggregate wealth, Figure 3A
illustrates that mutual funds dominate stocks in most household portfolios. Figure 3B
illustrates that the composition of the ﬁnancial portfolio is almost invariant with age.
This ﬁnding is consistent with Ameriks and Zeldes (2004).
The investigation of household diversiﬁcation must take into account the follow-
ing two observations. First, the database contains the total value of capital insurance
products but not the asset allocation within these products. We have checked that our
diversiﬁcation results are robust to reasonable variation in the assumptions we make
about capital insurance. Second, while individual holdings of bonds and derivatives are
observed in our dataset, they only account for a small share (about 5%) of household
portfolios. We simplify our analysis by excluding these assets from all the calculations
that follow. This approach is motivated by the fact that the asset pricing models used
in Section 4 do not apply well to bonds and derivatives. Furthermore, the contribution
of bonds to portfolio risk depends on the household’s investment horizon, which we do
not observe, since bonds can be viewed as safe assets for long-term investors (Campbell
and Viceira 2002).
F o re a c hh o u s e h o l d ,w ec o n s i d e rt h r e et y p e so fﬁnancial portfolios: the complete
portfolio, which contains all the stocks, mutual funds and cash owned by the household;
the risky portfolio, which contains stocks and mutual funds but excludes cash; and the
stock portfolio, which contains direct stockholdings but excludes equity owned through
mutual funds. The complete portfolio tells us the overall amount of risk taken by
the household; the risky portfolio allows us to decompose the risk the household takes;
and the stock portfolio allows us to compare our results with those of Goetzmann and
Kumar (2004), who observe only directly held stocks and not mutual funds. We ﬁnd that
87% of participating households own mutual funds, while 55% are direct stockholders.
Furthermore, 76% of direct stockholders also own mutual funds. These facts imply that
mutual funds play a key role in household diversiﬁcation.
In Table 2, we report summary statistics for these portfolios as well as other house-
hold characteristics. A household is viewed as a participant in risky asset markets if
its risky portfolio share is positive. A participating household takes ﬁn a n c i a lr i s ka n d
can make diversiﬁcation mistakes. Average ﬁnancial wealth is substantially higher for
participants ($42,000) than nonparticipants ($8,000). We also observe that for partici-
pants, the average value of the complete portfolio is about $36,000 as compared to the
$42,000 for an average ﬁnancial portfolio (which includes capital insurance, bonds and
derivatives).
113.3. Who Participates in Risky Asset Markets?
We next investigate the decision to participate in risky asset markets. At the end of
2002, 62% of Swedish households were participants. As in earlier research (e.g. Vissing-
Jorgensen 2002a,b), the dataset allows us to investigate the correlation between par-
ticipation and other household characteristics. In Table 3, we report the results of a
probit regression. The estimates show that a household is more likely to participate if
it has higher income, higher ﬁnancial or real estate wealth, higher liabilities or is more
educated. Participation also tends to be higher for retirees and investors with large con-
tributions to a private pension plan relative to disposable income. Variables negatively
related to participation include age, household size, unemployment and immigration.
Entrepreneurship has no signiﬁcant eﬀect.13 These ﬁndings are consistent with the
assumption that risky investments require ﬁx e dl e a r n i n ga n ds e t u pc o s t s ,w h i c hm a y
be smaller for more educated and sophisticated households and which are worth paying
only if ﬁnancial asset holdings are suﬃciently large.
We determine the relative importance of these variables by considering a reference
household that is assigned the average of all continuous characteristics and zero val-
ues for all dummy variables. We then examine one-by-one the marginal eﬀect of each
predicting variable. The third column of the probit regression reports the impact of
increasing a continuous regressor by one standard deviation, or of setting a dummy
variable to one. We observe that ﬁnancial wealth has the strongest impact on participa-
tion, increasing its probability by more than 20%. Disposable income, age, education,
immigration and the share of private pensions also have substantial eﬀects in excess of
5%.
We next ask whether the same observable characteristics predict the share of ﬁnan-
cial wealth invested in risky assets, conditional on participation. As shown in the fourth
and ﬁfth columns of Table 3, most predictors of participation do not help explain the
risky share. This ﬁnding is consistent with earlier studies (e.g. Ameriks and Zeldes
2004) showing that the average share of participating households is quite stable, and
in particular varies little with age. However the risky share is substantially higher
for households with higher ﬁnancial wealth, an eﬀect emphasized by Carroll (2002).
Household size and entrepreneurship have a clear negative impact. These eﬀects are
consistent with the intuition that individuals with more background risk, whether in
the form of entrepreneurial risk or random family needs, tend to reduce their exposure
to risky ﬁnancial assets.
13The entrepreneur dummy equals 1 if the household head works at least part-time for her own
business.
124. Household Diversiﬁcation
We now ask how households take risk, and speciﬁcally whether they choose mean-
variance eﬃcient portfolios. Our analysis of household diversiﬁcation abstracts away
from labor income, human capital and real estate considerations. This approach has
the advantage of comparing actual household decisions with the simplest and most
widely known precepts of ﬁnancial theory. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that
households do not hedge labor income risk (Massa and Simonov 2003), and we thus
focus in this paper on the more elementary problem of ﬁnancial portfolio diversiﬁcation.
Similarly, real estate can be viewed as a hedge against future rental costs (Flavin and
Yamashita 2002, Sinai and Souleles 2005), and it is therefore unclear whether it should
be included in the analysis of household risk. A more detailed investigation of these
issues is left for future research.
4.1. Idiosyncratic and Systematic Risk
We observe at the end of year t the portfolio of ﬁnancial assets owned by household h.
Let ωh denote the corresponding vector of portfolio weights. The portfolio generates a
random return between the end of year t and the next time the portfolio is rebalanced.
Since the endogenous decision to rebalance is unobserved in our yearly dataset, we
cannot directly compute household portfolio returns. For this reason, we investigate the
properties of household portfolios by estimating the moments of asset returns and then
inferring the household portfolio characteristics. For instance, we estimate the variance-
covariance matrix Σ of asset excess returns and then impute the variance σ2
h= ω0
hΣωh
of individual portfolios. Wermers (2000) has used a similar method to evaluate the
properties of stock portfolios held by mutual funds.
We begin by presenting results that impose no restriction on the mean returns of
ﬁnancial assets. Excess returns are computed for all assets as monthly returns in local
currency in excess of the yield on the one month Swedish T-bill. The variance-covariance
matrix Σ is estimated by the sample covariance matrix of the N assets. We present
in Table 4 the characteristics of the risky portfolios owned by households at the end
of 2002. The focus on risky portfolios allows us to investigate diversiﬁcation choices
while controlling for diﬀerences in cash holdings. The cross-sectional distribution of the
standard deviation σh is reported in the ﬁrst column. The total risk σh has a median
value of 20.7% per year and a 75th percentile equal to 25.8%. Most households thus select
risky portfolios with moderate standard deviations. A sizeable fraction of households,
however, select risky portfolios with high σh, such as 37.0% (90th percentile) or 69.6%
(99th percentile).
We compare these results to a diversiﬁed stock benchmark. Because Sweden is a
small and open economy, it is natural to consider a diversiﬁed portfolio of global stocks.
13We choose the All Country World Index (henceforth “world index”) compiled by Morgan
Stanley Capital International (MSCI). Because the world index is denominated in US
dollars, we must analyze currency risk to Swedish households. Speciﬁcally, the domestic
excess return on an asset is the diﬀerence between its return in SEK and the Swedish
Treasury bill rate. Consider a Swedish investor who purchases the index and fully hedges
the currency risk on the futures market. Under covered interest parity, the corresponding
excess return in SEK equals the excess dollar return on the index over the US Treasury
bill rate.14 For this reason, “world index in USD” will henceforth refer to a hedged
investment in the global portfolio, and “world index in SEK” to its unhedged equivalent.
Over the 1983-2004 period, the MSCI world index in USD has a mean excess return of
6.7% and a mean standard deviation of 14.7%, that is, a Sharpe ratio of 45.2%.
Given a benchmark index or asset B, we consider the return decomposition
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B,t respectively denote the domestic excess returns on the household
portfolio and on the benchmark.15 Note that the decomposition is purely statistical






The household portfolio thus has systematic risk |βh|σB, and idiosyncratic risk σi,h.
We report in Table 4 how the decomposition of a household’s risky portfolio varies
with its overall standard deviation σh. Speciﬁcally, we consider 100 households around
each percentile of σh and compute the average risk characteristics of these households.
For the median σh =2 0 .7%, systematic risk has a median of 13.6% and idiosyncratic
risk a median of 15.6%. Idiosyncratic risk is thus a large determinant of the household












has a median value of 56.7%. More than half the risk borne by a median household in
its risky portfolio is uncorrelated with the benchmark. This risk would be unrewarded
in a CAPM-type setting. We further note that the idiosyncratic variance share tends
to increase with σh. Households with very high σh bear a large fraction of idiosyncratic
risk in their portfolios.
14See the Appendix for further discussion. Solnik and McLeavy (2003) provide a textbook treatment
of currency risk and hedging.
15The variance covariance matrix Σ allows us to estimate the beta coeﬃcients β of the assets, and
thus of the household: βh = ω
0
hβ.
14The median value of βh is slightly lower than 1 for households with median exposure
σh. We observe that the betas of household portfolios grow monotonically with σh. The
relation between σh and βh is illustrated by the scatter plot in Figure 4. The solid line
represents |βh|σB, which is by (4.1) the theoretical lower bound of σh for a given level
of βh. Households are almost all located away from the theoretical lower bound deﬁned
by the hedged world index, but tend to cluster in the region around the unhedged world
index and the Swedish domestic index.
An alternative benchmark for observed portfolios is the value-weighted index of
all stocks and mutual funds held by Swedish households. We compute the wealth-
weighted portfolio of our total set of investors, wpop, which generates excess return rpop.
The standard deviation
σ(rh − rpop)
quantiﬁes the risk that households bear by holding their observed portfolios rather than
pooling their assets in a single common mutual fund. We observe that the median value
of σ(rh − rpop) is 7.3%, and is a U-shaped function of σh.
4.2. Contributors to Idiosyncratic Risk
We next analyze the idiosyncratic volatility of a household risky portfolio. Consistent
with previous notation, let εh,t denote the regression residual of the portfolio on the
benchmark. We have εh,t =
PN
n=1 ωn,hεn,t, where εn,t is the residual in a regression
of asset n on the benchmark. We consider a stylized symmetrical model in which the
residuals of all assets in a household’s portfolio have the same variance σ2
a,h and the
same correlation ρa,h with each other. It is straightforward to show that the variance











n,h is a measure of the concentration of the portfolio. Let ¯ ca denote
t h ea v e r a g ev a l u eo flnCa,h in the population, and ¯ Ca =e x p ( ¯ ca). A loglinearization of













This decomposition suggests that we should relate log idiosyncratic portfolio standard
deviation to the log of the average idiosyncratic standard deviation of assets in the
portfolio, the log concentration in the portfolio, and the average correlation across assets
in the portfolio. We can ask whether households that take a lot of idiosyncratic risk
t y p i c a l l yd os oa )b yp i c k i n gv o l a t i l ea s s e t s ,b )b yh o l d i n gac o n c e n t r a t e dp o r t f o l i o ,o r
c) by picking correlated assets.
15This decomposition treats all assets in the risky portfolio equally, whether they are
stocks or mutual funds. An alternative approach is to assume that mutual funds are
fully diversiﬁed. Let Dh denote the share of stocks directly held in the risky portfolio,
and let Cs,h denote the concentration of the stock portion of the portfolio. We can show
that












The alternative decomposition attributes idiosyncratic risk to a) a high share of stocks
rather than mutual funds in the portfolio; b) volatile stocks; c) a concentrated stock
portfolio; and d) correlated stocks.
Table 5 presents a simple empirical analysis of these two decompositions. The top
panel treats all assets symmetrically. The cross-sectional R2 of the decomposition (4.3)
is 98%. Portfolios are sorted by their idiosyncratic risk, and 1000 households are ex-
amined around each percentile of the idiosyncratic risk distribution. The ﬁrst column
reports idiosyncratic risk, the second column reports the average idiosyncratic volatility
of individual assets in the portfolio, the third column reports the concentration of the
portfolio, and the fourth column reports the average correlation of assets in the portfo-
lio. The main inﬂuence on idiosyncratic volatility is clearly the average idiosyncratic
volatility of the assets in the portfolio, which increases monotonically with idiosyncratic
risk. Concentration is U-shaped, while asset correlation is hump-shaped. These results
reﬂect the fact that households with low idiosyncratic risk often hold concentrated port-
folios of mutual funds, while households with high idiosyncratic risk hold concentrated
portfolios of individual stocks. In the middle of the idiosyncratic risk distribution,
households hold diversiﬁed portfolios of mutual funds and stocks which may tend to
be more correlated with one another. In support of this interpretation, the far right
column of the table shows that the stock share increases with idiosyncratic risk.
The bottom panel of Table 5 treats mutual funds as perfectly diversiﬁed. The cross-
sectional R2 of the decomposition (4.4) then falls to 71%. Stockholding households
only are sorted by their idiosyncratic risk. The remaining columns show the stock
share, average idiosyncratic volatility of stocks in the portfolio, concentration of the
stock portfolio, and average correlation of stocks in the portfolio. The main inﬂuence
on idiosyncratic risk is the share of individual stocks as opposed to mutual funds. At
the right tail of the risk distribution, the choice of highly volatile individual stocks also
has an eﬀect. Concentration is U-shaped; some households with low idiosyncratic risk
have a very small share of their wealth in one or two stocks, while households with high
idiosyncratic risk have a large share of their wealth in one or two stocks. Intermediate
households are more likely to hold diversiﬁed portfolios of individual stocks. Correlation
across stocks in the portfolio shows little variation across households.
These results show that in order to assess diversiﬁcation at the household level, it is
16essential to observe holdings of mutual funds. The concentration of the stock portfolio,
a statistic emphasized by Blume and Friend (1975) and Kelly (1995), is meaningless
without a complete picture of the remaining constituents of the portfolio.
4.3. Estimating the Mean Returns of Household Portfolios
Since expected asset returns are diﬃcult to estimate, we follow the tradition of inferring
the mean return vector μ from asset pricing models. We assume that assets are priced
on world markets in an international currency, speciﬁcally, that the CAPM holds in
dollar-denominated excess returns relative to the US Treasury bill:
re
j,t = βjre
m,t + εj,t. (4.5)
The market return re
m,t is measured as the US dollar return of the world index in excess
of the US T-bill. We show in the Appendix how to conduct mean-variance analysis in
Swedish kronas. Under covered interest rate parity, re
m,t coincides with the excess return
(in domestic currency) of the fully hedged version of the index relative to the Swedish
T-bill. In particular, the hedged index is mean-variance eﬃcient from the perspective
of a domestic investor.
As a robustness check, we also consider the dollar-denominated three-factor Fama
and French (1993) model:
re
j,t = βjre
m,t + γjSMBt + δjHMLt + εj,t, (4.6)
where SMB and HML are the US size and value factors obtained from Ken French’s
website.
The universe of assets consists of all the stocks and mutual funds owned by Swedish
households in our panel.16 We estimate each asset pricing model over the period 1983-
2004 and then infer μ, given Σ, using standard procedures summarized in the Appendix.
We use the estimated moments of individual asset returns to calculate the means
and variances of household portfolio returns. For each household, the dataset contains
holdings at the security level and the balances of bank accounts. The risk free rate
in Sweden is again proxied by the yield on the one-month Swedish T-bill. Since the
spread between the risk-free rate and the yield on bank deposits can be considered as
a compensation for bank services, bank balances are assumed to earn the risk-free rate.
The same assumption is extended to money market funds and veriﬁed empirically.
We report in Figure 5 a scatter plot of household portfolios in the mean-standard
deviation plane. In order to produce a clear picture, we plot a subsample of 10,000
16Since the factors used in the CAPM and Fama-French models are stock portfolios, these models
may not be suitable for estimating the average returns on bond funds. We check in unreported work
that our results are robust to the treatment of bond funds.
17randomly selected households. Panel A shows the risk characteristics of households’
stock portfolios, which appear quite ineﬃcient as found by Goetzmann and Kumar
(2004). Panel B includes households’ cash and mutual fund holdings and presents a
more optimistic view of households’ risk management. Households appear much better
diversiﬁed when we include their holdings of mutual funds and scale their risky asset
holdings by their total ﬁnancial assets rather than merely their stockholdings.
We report in Table 6 the most widely held stocks and mutual funds in our entire
database. For individual stocks (Panel A), we eliminate households that hold more
than $5 million in a single stock. This procedure ﬁlters out large insider holdings and
enables us to focus on “popular stocks”. For each company, the columns of Panel A
report respectively: (1) the dollar value of direct holdings; (2) the company’s weight in
the aggregate value of household direct stockholdings; (3) the fraction of direct investors
who own at least one share of the company; (4) the fraction of the company’s market
capitalization that is directly held by households; (5) the company’s value-weighted
share of the Swedish stockmarket; (6) the stock’s Sharpe ratio estimated with the dollar
CAPM.
The telecommunications company Ericsson is the most widely held stock in Sweden.
I ti sd i r e c t l yo w n e db ya l m o s th a l fo fd i r e c ti n v e s t o r sa n di t ss h a r eo fd i r e c ti n v e s t m e n t s
is large (18.9%) relative to market cap. Other popular stocks are fashion companies
(Hennes and Mauritz), telecommunications companies (Telia Sonera), paper manufac-
turers (Svenska Cellulosa), pharmaceuticals (Astra Zeneca and Pharmacia), and banks
(SEB, SHB, Förenings Savings Bank). There is also a Finnish stock (Nokia). We note
that these stocks are well-known household names, often with relatively low Sharpe ra-
tios. The table is thus consistent with the familiarity motive for direct stock investment
proposed by Huberman (2001) and others.
In Panel B of Table 6 we report the ten most widely held mutual funds. These
funds are characterized by considerably higher Sharpe ratios on the order of 30%. They
are sold by a few large banks: the aforementioned SEB, SHB, and FSB, along with
Nordea. Panel C reports the composition of these ten mutual funds. We note that
most of them are internationally diversiﬁed. With the exception of SEB Sverige, each
fund holds more than 25% of its assets in international securities. The most widely held
fund (FSB/Robur Kapitalinvest) contains 54% of international stocks, while the second
m o s tp o p u l a rf u n d( N o r d e aF u t u r a )h o l d s1 7 %i nf o r e i g ns t o c k sa n d3 3 %i nf o r e i g n
bonds. These numbers suggest that popular mutual funds enable Swedish households to
achieve reasonable levels of international diversiﬁcation. None of these funds, however,
hedges for currency risk. It is thus considerably easier for Swedish households to hold
portfolios with the eﬃciency of the unhedged world index than to hold portfolios that
are comparable to the hedged world index.
184.4. Mean-Variance Measures of Diversiﬁcation
We now provide a detailed quantitative assessment of the losses due to suboptimal
diversiﬁc a t i o n .T h em o m e n t so fa l la s s e t sa n dp o r t f o l i o sa r eb a s e do nt h ed o l l a ra s s e t
pricing models (4.5) and (4.6) described in the previous subsection.
Relative Sharpe Ratio Loss. Diversiﬁcation losses can be computed by comparing
the Sharpe ratio of a household portfolio to the Sharpe ratio of a benchmark index SB.
The benchmark need not necessarily be eﬃcient, so that under the CAPM SB can diﬀer
from the maximum Sharpe ratio Sm of the market portfolio. For every household h, we





the corresponding Sharpe ratio. Of course, the Sharpe ratio on the household’s com-
plete portfolio is also Sh. The loss from imperfect diversiﬁcation with respect to the





In Table 7, we consider four indexes for the benchmark Sharpe ratio SB : 1) the world
index in USD; 2) the world index in SEK; 3) a krona-denominated index of the domestic
stock market (MSCI Sweden Equity); and 4) the highest Sharpe ratio achieved by any
household portfolio in our sample. Under the CAPM, the benchmark Sharpe ratio SB
increases from 27.4% for the Swedish index to 45.2% for the hedged world index, which
is mean-variance eﬃcient by construction. The world index in SEK has an intermediate
Sharpe ratio equal to 34.6%; this illustrates that the ineﬃciency of the Swedish index
is due to both currency risk and suboptimal concentration in national stocks. The most
eﬃcient household in our sample has a Sharpe ratio of 40.6%, somewhat lower than the
theoretically achievable maximum.
The Fama-French asset pricing model provides analogous results. The hedged world
index has by design the same Sharpe ratio as under the CAPM. The CAPM and FF
provide very similar estimates for the Swedish index and the world index in SEK. The
highest Sharpe ratio achieved by a household is 45.5%, which is slightly higher than the
45.2% value reported for the hedged world index. Thus, while FF oﬀers the possibility
of outperforming the hedged world index, the gains achieved by households are quite
limited in practice.
When the benchmark portfolio used to calculate the relative Sharpe ratio is mean-
variance eﬃcient, as in the case of the hedged world index in the dollar CAPM, the
relative Sharpe ratio loss is a nonlinear transformation of the share of idiosyncratic








Thus a high share of idiosyncratic variance, as found in Table 4, implies a high relative
Sharpe ratio loss with respect to the mean-variance eﬃcient index.17
Table 7 reports the cross-sectional distribution of the relative Sharpe ratio loss in
our sample of Swedish households. The top panel looks at complete household port-
folios (equivalently, risky household portfolios), while the bottom panel looks at stock
portfolios for comparison with previous work. The columns are grouped in pairs, as-
suming the CAPM and Fama-French model respectively. The ﬁrst pair of columns uses
the hedged world index as the benchmark; the next pair of columns uses the unhedged
world index; the third pair uses the Swedish index; and the ﬁnal pair uses the household
portfolio in our sample that has the highest Sharpe ratio.
For complete portfolios, the median household has a relative Sharpe ratio loss of 35%
with respect to the hedged world index under the assumption that the dollar CAPM
holds, and a slightly smaller loss of 32% if the Fama-French model holds. This diﬀerence
implies that Swedish household portfolios have a slight tilt towards small stocks and
value stocks, relative to the world index, which improves their returns slightly in the
Fama-French model.18 The relative Sharpe ratio loss is smaller, at 14% (14%) with
respect to the unhedged world index. Relative to the Swedish index, the median Swedish
household actually has a negative relative Sharpe ratio loss of -8% (0%), indicating that
Swedish households are suﬃciently diversiﬁed internationally to outperform their own
domestic stock index. Finally, the relative Sharpe ratio loss with respect to the best-
performing household in our sample is analogous to the results with respect to the
hedged world index.
These results are consistent with the fact that the portfolios of many Swedish house-
holds contain a large fraction of international investments and mutual funds. Median
losses are relatively limited compared to the unhedged world index, but quite substantial
compared to its hedged version. This is a sensible ﬁnding since unhedged international
securities and equity funds are widely available to individual investors, as we saw in





















where σi,h and σi,B denote idiosyncratic risk relative to the eﬃcient index.
18We verify this intuition by computing the loadings of individual households on the size and value
factors. The size loading is positive for about 90% of households, and its cross-sectional median and
mean are both equal to 0.23. Similarly, the value loading is positive for about 80% of households, and
its cross-sectional median and mean are 0.08 and 0.10 respectively.
20Table 6, while currency-hedged investments are less common. Wider availability of
currency-hedged hedged global equity funds might further improve international diver-
siﬁcation of Swedish portfolios.
The importance of mutual funds is underscored by the fact that in the bottom panel
of Table 7 we report substantially higher losses with stock portfolios. In particular, while
the complete portfolio tends to outperform the national stock market, the stock portfolio
tends to underperform it. A dataset containing only direct stock holdings might lead
us to conclude that households underperform the domestic equity market; when mutual
funds are observed, however, we see that the results are reversed.
Finally, the table reveals large heterogeneity in the losses incurred by households.
For example, 5% of households have Sharpe ratios below one-third the level of the
hedged world index. While a large fraction of households thus seem to achieve a fairly
reasonable level of performance, especially when compared to readily available indexes
such as the Swedish or unhedged world index, a non-trivial fraction of the population
seems to invest in a highly ineﬃcient manner.
Return Loss. The relative Sharpe ratio loss quantiﬁes the diversiﬁcation level achieved
by a risky portfolio. For complete portfolios, however, this statistic provides only limited
information on overall eﬃciency. Consider for instance an investor who allocates a small
fraction of his wealth to a single stock, and invests the rest in the riskless asset. The
relative Sharpe ratio loss reveals the ineﬃciency of the risky portfolio, but the investor
might in fact be very close to the mean-variance frontier. This is an important example,
since Table 5B shows that some investors own only one or two individual stocks, giving
them a high concentration Cs,h in the decomposition (4.4), but invest only a small
fraction of their wealth in these stocks, giving them a low Dh which oﬀsets the eﬀect of
concentration.
Accordingly we consider the following alternative measure. The return loss is the
average return lost by the investor by choosing a suboptimal portfolio at her chosen risk
level:
RLh = wh(SBσh − μh),
where wh denotes the portfolio’s weight in risky assets. In the mean-standard deviation
plane, the return loss is the vertical distance between the household portfolio and the
eﬃcient frontier.
In Table 8, panel A, we report return losses for households’ complete portfolios
(setting wh equal to the share of the risky portfolio in the complete portfolio) and for
their risky portfolios (setting wh equal to one). The median return loss on the complete
portfolio with respect to the hedged world index is 1.17% if the CAPM holds, and 1.04%
if the Fama-French model holds. The median return loss is smaller with respect to the
unhedged world index at 0.30% (0.29%), and negative with respect to the Swedish index
21at -0.11% (0.00%). Median losses are about three times larger, in absolute value, for
risky portfolios than for complete portfolios. This is consistent with the large share of
Swedish household wealth held in riskless assets.
As with Sharpe ratios, we observe considerable heterogeneity in return losses. The
costs of underdiversiﬁcation are modest for a majority of investors but are substantial
for a sizeable minority. For instance, under the CAPM, almost 5% of investors have
return losses on their complete portfolios of 5% per year or more.
One explanation for return losses might be that households are unable to leverage
the market portfolio (Black 1972). A risk-tolerant household might rationally select an
ineﬃcient portfolio of high-beta stocks in order to obtain a higher expected return than
is available by holding the unleveraged market portfolio. We check that only 3.7% of
complete portfolios have a beta larger than one, a necessary condition to be justiﬁed by
this constraint. In unreported work, we have reestimated the distribution of losses on
the subset of households with a beta less than one, and have found very little diﬀerence.
Thus, borrowing constraints seem to have little eﬀect on the reported loss distribution.
Another concern with the losses in Table 8A is that they measure underdiversiﬁcation
costs in return units; that is, they measure costs relative to the size of an investor’s
portfolio. If an investor has only a very small portfolio, the implied cost in dollars
or as a fraction of income may be negligible. To address this concern, in panel B
of Table 8 we report return losses in dollars per year and as a fraction of disposable
income (measured as an average over three years to reduce the inﬂuence of temporary
ﬂuctuations). We see that the median cost of underdiversiﬁcation is only $131 per year
under the CAPM ($118 under the Fama-French model) with respect to the hedged world
index, and $33 per year ($30) with respect to the unhedged world index. However the
distribution of dollar costs has a fat right tail. The 90th percentile is $1,190 ($1,039)
with respect to the hedged world index, and there are some large dollar numbers in
the top decile resulting from large undiversiﬁed Swedish portfolios. Similarly, when we
scale by disposable income we ﬁnd that the median return loss is only 0.51% (0.46%) of
disposable income, but the 90th percentile is 4.48% (3.94%) of disposable income. Some
extremely high numbers in the far right tail of this distribution result from disposable
income close to zero.
Connecting the Dots. We now summarize how the various results ﬁt together. The
risky portfolio of a participating household has a median value of $4,372 (Table 2) and a
median βh equal to 0.92 (Table 4). Since the risk premium on the global equity index is
about 6.7%, the median participating household earns an excess payoﬀ of $4,372×6.7%×
0.92 or $269 per year compared to a pure cash investment. In Table 4, we observe that
56.7% of the risk born by the median household is idiosyncratic and thus unrewarded.
The corresponding Sharpe ratio loss RSRL is by (4.7) equal to 34.2%,w h i c hm a t c h e s
22quite closely the estimate reported in Table 7. Since the median volatility σh of the risky
portfolio is 20.7% (Table 4) and the Sharpe ratio of the currency-hedged world index is
45.2%, we infer that the median return loss is 45.2% × 20.7% × 34.2% or 3.21%,w h i c h
is consistent with Table 8A.19 The median dollar loss from suboptimal diversiﬁcation
should thus be $4,372 × 3.21% = $140,w h i c hi sc l o s et ot h e$131 estimate reported in
Table 8B.
Thus, by choosing an underdiversiﬁed portfolio, the median household earns a risk
premium of about $269 per year on its risky portfolio worth $4,372 instead of the
$409 that it could earn by picking an eﬃcient portfolio with the same volatility. While
this description characterizes a large fraction of the population, we also ﬁnd that some
investors make very poor choices and incur much larger losses.
4.5. Utility Loss from Underdiversiﬁcation
We now propose a simple utility loss calculation to measure the overall economic cost
of household underdiversiﬁcation.
Principle. Consider a household with an inﬁnite horizon, CRRA utility of consumption









The household is able to invest in two assets: a safe asset with log return rf, and a risky
asset with log return rt+1 distributed i.i.d. normal. Let σ denote the standard deviation
of the risky asset, and S its Sharpe ratio.
The household’s investment problem consists of choosing the optimal portfolio share
in the risky asset, w, and the optimal consumption-wealth ratio. We show in the Ap-





















Financial opportunities (rf and S) thus impact household utility through the choice of
the consumption-wealth ratio.
This gives us all the ingredients we need to analyze the welfare eﬀect of a change
in Sharpe ratios. We consider a household h with risk aversion γh and observed Sharpe
19The return loss is (Sm − Sh)σh, or equivalently RLh = SmσhRSRLh.
23ratio Sh. If the household adopts instead the Sharpe ratio SB of a benchmark, the eﬀect







The utility loss increases with the ineﬃciency of the household portfolio, S2
B − S2
h,a n d
decreases with household risk aversion γh.
Estimates of Utility Loss. While the Sharpe ratios in (4.9) are easily measured, the
selection of γh must be addressed. Since an investor’s portfolio is in principle informative
on her risk-aversion, we ﬁnd it sensible to impute γh from the observed portfolio of risky
assets. For this reason, assume that the investor correctly perceives the Sharpe ratio Sh
of her complete portfolio but is unaware of the benchmark Sharpe ratio SB.W et h e n
infer from (4.8) that the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion satisﬁes
γh = Sh/(whσh),
where σh is the standard deviation of the risky portfolio. This relation provides an
estimate of the risk aversion of each household. It is easy to check that with the
eﬃcient benchmark, the inferred utility loss ULh is necessarily larger than the return loss
RLh (the increase in expected return at a constant standard deviation) of the complete
portfolio. This because households incur two types of losses: (1) they do not choose the
highest-yielding portfolio given their risk level; and (2) they choose a suboptimal level
of risk because they are unduly pessimistic about the optimal Sharpe ratio.
We report the estimates in Table 9. The median utility loss is equivalent to a decline
in the riskless interest rate of 1.52% under the CAPM and 1.32% under the Fama-French
model compared to the hedged world index. The median utility loss is thus relatively
modest, and only slightly larger than the return loss reported in Table 8. The right tail
of the utility loss distribution is, however, even fatter than the right tail of the return
loss distribution, because the diﬀerence between the utility loss and return loss increases
when these losses are large. To understand the magnitude of these losses, the middle
panel of Table 9 reports them in dollars per year, and the bottom panel expresses them
as a fraction of disposable income. 5% of households incur utility losses greater than
$3000 per year or 10% of their disposable income, relative to the hedged world index.
Relative to the unhedged world index, the losses are only one-third as large, but are
still substantial.
These results depend of course on the assumption we have made about risk aversion.
To see how sensitive our results are to the choice of γ,w ec a nc o m p u t eu t i l i t yl o s s e s
for a range of possible γ for a typical investor with a relative Sharpe ratio loss of 35%.
Relative to the hedged world index, we ﬁnd that risk aversion of 2 gives a utility loss of
242.95%. The utility loss falls to 1.97% for risk aversion of 3, 1.48% f o rr i s ka v e r s i o no f
4, 1.18% for risk aversion of 5, 0.98% for risk aversion of 6, and 0.84% for risk aversion
of 7. The median utility loss reported in Table 9 roughly coincides with a calibrated
value of γ between 4 and 6. Thus our results in Table 9 do not depend on extreme
assumptions about risk aversion.
Mutual Fund Fees. The return and utility losses we have estimated may be sensitive
to our treatment of mutual funds. We have priced mutual funds like any other assets by
using the CAPM or the Fama-French model. To check the robustness of our results, we
have alternatively estimated the expected return on a fund by: (1) computing its factor
loading(s); (2) inferring the corresponding gross expected return from the asset pricing
models; (3) computing the net expected return by subtracting a yearly fee of 0.5% for
a bond fund or 1% for other funds. With this procedure, the median Sharpe ratio loss
on the complete portfolio is 45%, which is substantially higher than the 35% estimate
reported in Table 7. The corresponding median return and utility losses are respectively
1.57% and 2.26% of the complete portfolio on a yearly basis, as compared with the 1.17%
and 1.52% reported in Table 8 and 9. The estimated impact of the fee on the return loss
is consistent with the following quick calculation. A participant with median return loss
holds about 13% of her complete portfolio in bond funds and 32% in other funds. Fees
therefore increase the return loss by approximately 0.13×0.5%+0.32×1.0%, or 0.39%.
Mutual fund fees of this magnitude have a meaningful but not overwhelming impact
on measured diversiﬁcation losses. We acknowledge, however, that there is considerable
heterogeneity in fees, and view a more careful treatment of mutual funds as deserving
of further research.
5. Who Is Underdiversiﬁed?
We have shown that many Swedish households choose reasonably eﬃcient portfolios, but
a few appear to be dramatically underdiversiﬁed. We now ask how the characteristics
of households predict the characteristics of the portfolios they hold.
5.1. Demographic Predictors of Household Investment Strategies
We break the return loss on the complete portfolio into several components. Let wh
denote the share of risky assets in the complete portfolio, and let βh and σh denote
the risk characteristics (beta and standard deviation) of the risky portfolio. Under the
CAPM, the household earns an expected excess return (Ere
m)whβh = whσhSh on its
complete portfolio, but could have earned whσhSB by investing in the benchmark port-
folio B while taking the same level of risk. The return loss on the complete portfolio is
25therefore whσh(SB − Sh)=( Ere






where RSRLh =1−Sh/SB is the relative Sharpe ratio loss on the household portfolio.
This exact decomposition relates the complete return loss to a) the portfolio share of
risky assets; b) the risky portfolio’s beta; and c) a nonlinear transformation of the
relative Sharpe ratio loss.
We report in Table 10A the cross-sectional decomposition of RLcomplete,h with re-
spect to the hedged world index. We observe that the median loss of 1.2% corresponds
to a risky share of about one half, a beta slightly below unity, and a relative Sharpe
ratio loss of about one half. These estimates are roughly consistent with the numbers
d i s c u s s e da tt h ee n do fS e c t i o n4 . 4 .
Cross-sectional variation in return losses is driven primarily by the risky share wh
until one reaches the top decile of return losses, when this share ﬂattens out. Within the
top decile the risky portfolio’s systematic risk exposure βh and the level of idiosyncratic
risk are important for generating the largest return losses. Table 10B shows similar
results with respect to the unhedged world index, except that at the left tail of the
distribution some households invest eﬃciently relative to this index and achieve very
s m a l lo re v e nn e g a t i v er e t u r nl o s s e s .
Next we ask how the three determinants of return loss–aggressiveness, systematic
risk exposure, and portfolio ineﬃciency–covary with observable household characteris-
tics. We take the natural log of (5.1) to obtain
lnRLcomplete,h =l n ( Ere
m)+l nwh +l n|βh| +l n
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
RSRLh
1 − RSRLh
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯, (5.2)
and regress each component on demographic variables in Table 11.
The ﬁrst column of the table shows that the return loss increases with measures of
ﬁnancial sophistication such as wealth, education, the ratio of private pension contribu-
tions to income, and liabilities. The remaining columns reveal that these characteristics
are typically associated with more eﬃcient investing (lower Sharpe ratio loss), but also
considerably higher shares of risky assets. Households with standard predictors of ﬁ-
nancial sophistication invest more in risky assets and choose more diversiﬁed portfolios,
but overall they bear higher return losses than unsophisticated households. Conversely,
the retired and unemployed dummies are associated with lower investment skills and
lower risky shares, which overall result in lower return losses. These regularities are
consistent with the view that households are aware of their investment skills and choose
their risky shares accordingly.
Consistent with Heaton and Lucas (2000), entrepreneurs tend to invest less in risky
ﬁnancial assets and as a result have lower return losses than the rest of the population.
26The natural interpretation is that entrepreneurs bear idiosyncratic risk in their own
private businesses, which discourages them from taking additional risk in public equity.
The results in Table 11 are robust to the choice of the benchmark index. If we
measure log return losses relative to the unhedged world index, as in Table 10B, we
continue to ﬁnd that sophisticated households incur higher return losses.20
Finally, we acknowledge that the explanatory power of our regressions is quite low.
There is considerable heterogeneity in investment strategies which is not captured by
the demographic variables in our dataset.
We now look in more detail at what sophisticated households do better to achieve
a high Sharpe ratio. In Table 5 we showed that the most important determinants of
the idiosyncratic volatility in the risky portfolio appear to be the idiosyncratic volatility
of individual assets (treating mutual funds and stocks symmetrically) or the share of
individual stocks and the idiosyncratic volatility of those stocks (treating mutual funds
as perfectly diversiﬁed). In Table 12 we regress these portfolio characteristics onto
household attributes. We see that consistent with Table 11, households with higher
ﬁnancial wealth tend to bear less idiosyncratic risk. They are more likely to own
individual stocks, but they have a smaller share of their portfolios in individual stocks
and invest in less volatile stocks. Unreported regressions show that they also own less
concentrated stock portfolios. Large households, and households that contribute to
private pension schemes, are also characterized by eﬃcient investment behavior.
I nT a b l e1 3w er e ﬁne our analysis of the complete return loss RLcomplete,h by con-
sidering predictors of extreme portfolio characteristics. We use probit regressions to
predict whether a household is in the top 5% of the population in terms of: (1) return
loss; (2) systematic risk exposure of the complete portfolio βcomplete,h = whβh; or (3)
the relative Sharpe ratio loss of the complete (or risky) portfolio.
M a n yo ft h er e s u l t si nT a b l e1 3a r ec o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h o s ei nT a b l e1 1 . O n c ea g a i n
we observe that measures of ﬁnancial sophistication tend to predict more eﬃcient but
also more aggressive investing. However the balance of these eﬀects, in the return loss
regression, is somewhat diﬀerent now that we are predicting only the probability of an
extreme return loss. We ﬁnd that ﬁnancial and real-estate wealth are insigniﬁcant
predictors of extreme return loss, although disposable income and education remain
signiﬁcant. Investors who contribute to private pensions are less likely to have large
return losses, while entrepreneurs are more likely to have such losses. This result
suggests that while many entrepreneurs invest cautiously to compensate for their private
business risk, some entrepreneurs are highly aggressive in their ﬁnancial portfolios as
well as their private business activities.
20Since some return losses are negative relative to the unhedged world index, we must either truncate
the return loss distribution before taking logs, or measure return losses in levels. If we do the latter,
we obtain results similar to those reported for extreme return losses in Table 13.
27Overall, the population of extreme losers is heterogeneous. It seems to include both
clueless households and aggressive ﬁnancial sophisticates.
5.2. The Welfare Cost of Nonparticipation
Economists often argue that nonparticipation in risky asset markets is a serious invest-
ment mistake. When calculating the welfare cost of nonparticipation, it is standard
to assume that a participating household invests eﬃciently and therefore earns the eq-
uity premium. We have shown, however, that many households are underdiversiﬁed.
We now take this phenomenon into account and present more realistic estimates of the
welfare cost of nonparticipation.









We now investigate several scenarios for the total risk w∗
hσ∗
h and the Sharpe ratio S∗
h.
First, we assume that if the household participated, it would obtain the Sharpe
ratio of a diversiﬁed index and would choose the average total risk w∗
hσ∗
h =9 .5% in the
complete portfolios of participants. The nonparticipation return loss RLh is then 4.3%
for a household that would invest in the hedged world index (S∗
h =4 5 .2%),a n d3.3% for
a household that would invest in the unhedged world index (S∗
h =3 4 .6%). Consistent
with earlier research, we ﬁnd that the cost of nonparticipation is high relative to an
eﬃcient risky investment strategy.
It may be more realistic to impute the levels of S∗
h and w∗
hσ∗
h from the observ-
able characteristics of nonparticipating households. As a second scenario, we regress
the Sharpe ratios and volatilities of participants’ complete portfolios on the observable
characteristics of Table 3 and apply the results of this regression to nonparticipants.
This procedure suggests that the average nonparticipant would select a complete port-
folio with Sharpe ratio S∗
h =2 6 .9% and volatility w∗
hσ∗
h =8 .4%. Both these numbers
are slightly lower than the average among participants, because nonparticipating house-
holds are demographically similar to participating households that invest cautiously and
ineﬃciently. With these numbers, the estimated return loss on the complete portfolio
is only 2.3%.
We can use a similar procedure to compute predicted return losses for speciﬁch o u s e -
holds. Household A has dummy variables that are all equal to zero. That is, the head
of household A is a native Swede who is employed, is not an entrepreneur, does not hold
a high-school degree and is not contributing to a private pension plan. The household’s
non-dummy variables (size, income, log ﬁnancial and real estate wealth, log liabili-
ties) are set equal to the average among nonparticipants (Table 2). We impute that
28S∗
h =2 7 .0% and w∗
hσ∗
h =7 .6%, and infer that the nonparticipation return loss is then
2.1%.
Household B has the same characteristics as household A, but is an immigrant. The
imputed values S∗
h =2 5 .9% and w∗
hσ∗
h =8 .5% imply that the nonparticipation return
loss is then 2.2%. Similarly, household C has the same chacteristics as household A,
but is unemployed. The imputed values are S∗
h =2 6 .8% and w∗
hσ∗
h =7 .6%, and the
nonparticipation return loss is then 2.0%. These results suggest that nonparticipation
return losses have average values between 2.0 and 2.3%.
Utility-based calculations provide similar estimates. A non-participating agent has
imputed risk aversion γ = S∗
h/(w∗
hσ∗
h). G i v e nt h ei m p u t e dv a l u e sS∗
h =2 6 .9% and
w∗
hσ∗
h =8 .4%, we infer that γ =3 .2. By choosing not to participate, the agent thus incurs
ULn = S2
m/(2γ) or ULn =3 .2% relative to an agent investing optimally. If the agent
participated, he would typically incur ULp =( S2
m − S∗2
h )/(2γ), or ULp =2 .1% relative
to an agent investing optimally. The utility loss from non-participation is therefore only
1.1% when the costs of underdiversiﬁcation are taken into account.
Overall, we see that the standard analysis considerably overestimates the cost of
nonparticipation by ignoring the ineﬃciency of household portfolios. Households that
stay out would likely be down if they entered the market. Once we take account
of this eﬀect, nonparticipation appears to be a smaller mistake, and may be easier to
rationalize using small frictions such as the participation costs postulated by Haliassos
and Bertaut (1995), Vissing-Jorgensen (2003), and Calvet, Gonzalez-Eiras and Sodini
(2004).
6. Has Investment Behavior Changed over Time?
We have so far investigated the participation and investment behavior of Swedish house-
holds at the end of 2002. World stock markets experienced very rapid growth in the late
1990s and then a sharp decline in the early 2000’s. The returns on the world index in
dollars (including dividends) were +25% in 1999, −13% in 2000, −17% in 2001 and
−20% in 2002. The Swedish stock market was even more volatile, with SEK returns
of +91% in 1999, −12% in 2000, −18% in 2001 and −42% in 2002. The volatility and
negative returns of the early 2000’s may have taught inexperienced investors about ﬁ-
nancial risk and thus may have modiﬁed their participation and diversiﬁcation behavior
during the 1999-2002 period.
To explore this possibility, we recompute all our results for those households in our
sample that existed at the end of 1999, the earliest date included in the dataset. To
save space we do not report here the corresponding graphs and tables, but summarize
our main ﬁndings.
Participation is slightly lower in 1999, with 60% of households holding risky assets
29as compared with 62% in 2002. The relation between participation and household de-
mographic and ﬁnancial characteristics remains broadly unchanged. Probit regression
e s t i m a t e sh a v et h es a m es i g n si nb o t hy e a r s ,w i t ht h ee x c e p t i o no ft h ee n t r e p r e n e u r
and student dummies. The only notable diﬀerence is that the coeﬃcient on wealth is
substantially higher in 1999. This ﬁnding is consistent with the fact that participants
rapidly increased their wealth in the booming stockmarket of the late 1990’s.
We next investigate whether the diversiﬁcation losses of participants diﬀer in 1999.
Losses on the risky portfolio are similar in both years, but the stock and complete port-
folios generally exhibit higher diversiﬁcation losses in 1999. We focus for simplicity on
the hedged version of the world index, but other benchmarks produce similar diﬀerences
in investment behavior between 1999 and 2002.
The stock portfolio exhibits higher relative Sharpe ratio losses RSRL in 1999, as
illustrated by the median value of 0.54 (0.51 in 2002) and the 95th percentile of 0.95
(0.77). Swedish households held poorly diversiﬁed stock portfolios at the peak of the
stock market.
The risky portfolio, on the other hand, exhibits fairly similar levels of diversiﬁcation
in both years. The RSRL has almost the same median of 0.34 (0.35). The distribution
of return losses is also very similar up to the 95th percentile: the median and 95th
percentile are respectively 3.0% and 11.8% in 1999. Extreme losses, however, tend to be
higher. The 99th percentile of RL equals 29.9% in 1999 (17.9% in 2002).
Complete portfolios exhibit higher diversiﬁcation losses in 1999. The return loss has
a median of 1.6% (1.2% in 2002), a 95th percentile of 6.7% (5.0% in 2002) and a 99th
percentile of 13.2% (9.9% ). The rescaled measures are also higher. For instance, the
dollar loss has a median of $250 and a 95th percentile of $5,560. These large losses
originate in more aggressive positions in 1999. Speciﬁcally, the share of risky assets is
52% in 1999 as compared to 43% in 2002.
This analysis shows that Swedish households were already taking advantage of di-
versiﬁcation through mutual funds in 1999. By 2002, they were also holding more
diversiﬁed portfolios of individual stocks. The perils of holding stock portfolios concen-
trated in a few companies or sectors, such as Ericsson or the telecommunications sector,
had become apparent during the period. A small group of participants were holding
very underdiversiﬁed risky portfolios at the millennium. This group had either left the
market or made wiser choices by the end of 2002.
We have also investigated possible changes in the relation between diversiﬁcation
behavior and household characteristics. The risky share regression produces very similar
results in 1999. Variables such as education, immigration and household size have
almost exactly the same eﬀect on the return loss RLcomplete as in 2002. Private pension
has an insigniﬁcant impact on RLcomplete. The most notable change is that household
wealth tends to increase the risky share and thus the return loss more strongly in 1999.
30However, the impact of household wealth on the diversiﬁcation loss RSRL is similar
across these two years.
Overall, the 1999 data conﬁrm the robustness of the main results of the paper. Richer
and more sophisticated households invest more eﬃciently but also more aggressively, and
thus incur higher return losses. This result is actually stronger in 1999 because investors
were even more aggressive in that year.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have taken a ﬁrst look at the properties of household portfolios using
a unique Swedish dataset. We have found that the joint observation of stocks and
mutual funds is quantitatively extremely important for the assessment of household
diversiﬁcation. This should not be surprising given that 76% of Swedish households
that own stocks directly also hold mutual funds.
Almost two-thirds (62%) of households participated in risky asset markets in Sweden
at the end of 2002. Participating households allocated on average 40% of their ﬁnancial
wealth to cash and 60% to risky assets. Mutual funds represent the largest share of
risky assets for most households, except for the very rich whose portfolios are dominated
by individual stocks. The dataset permits us to compute the risk characteristics of the
portfolio of risky assets. The median volatility is 20.7%, the median systematic exposure
βh is close to unity, and the average excess return implied by a global version of the
CAPM is 6.1%.
We have found that many Swedish households are well diversiﬁed. The median
return loss implied by the global CAPM is 1.2% of ﬁnancial wealth, or $131 per year
relative to the currency-hedged world index. This loss is modest even though it is very
diﬃcult for retail investors to achieve the eﬃciency of the hedged world index. The
median loss relative to the unhedged world index is even smaller, and a majority of
Swedish households actually outperform the Sharpe ratio of their own domestic stock
index. These encouraging results reﬂect substantial international diversiﬁcation, which
Swedish households achieve through the equity and balanced funds sold by domestic
banks. These numbers ignore fund expenses, assuming that mutual funds, like stocks
held directly, oﬀer returns that are described by the global CAPM. Rough calculations
assuming equal fees across all mutual funds slightly increase return losses; in future work
we hope to be able to measure fund-speciﬁc fees and the resulting drag on household
investment performance.
While a large fraction of retail investors choose well-diversiﬁed portfolios, we also
identify the unhappy few that select highly concentrated risky portfolios. For instance,
5% of the population incur return losses that exceed 5% of ﬁnancial wealth or $2,200
per year. For 1% of the population, the losses even reach 10% of ﬁnancial wealth, or
31$7,500 per year.
We have also considered the 38% of households that do not participate in risky
asset markets. We estimate the return loss from nonparticipation at 4.3% if we assume
that such households would participate by earning the maximum available Sharpe ratio
of the hedged global index. But this number overstates the cost of nonparticipation
because nonparticipants might not diversify eﬀectively if they did participate. The
estimated return loss falls to 2.3% when we estimate the likely investment performance
of nonparticipants.
We have shown that predictors of ﬁnancial sophistication (such as wealth, income,
and education) predict higher levels of participation, higher volatility in risky portfolios,
and higher Sharpe ratios. Richer and more sophisticated households invest more eﬃ-
ciently, but they also take more risk so they bear higher costs from portfolio ineﬃciency.
I nt h i sp a p e rw eh a v ec o n s i d e r e dﬁnancial portfolios in isolation, ignoring human
capital and real estate. We doubt that underdiversiﬁed ﬁnancial portfolios can be
rationalized by oﬀsetting risks in human capital or real estate, and previous research by
Massa and Simonov (2003) has found no evidence that households pick their directly
owned stocks to hedge such risks. However our dataset does contain a great deal
of information on both income and real estate holdings, and we plan to exploit this
information in future research.
328. Appendix
8.1. Bank Account Imputation
The balance of a bank account is frequently unreported when the account yields less
than 100 SEK (or $11) during the year. This problem aﬀects about 2,000,000 of the
4,800,000 households in our 2002 dataset. We have considered two main imputation
methods.
The ﬁrst method takes advantage of the comprehensive nature of the data. We
estimate the aggregate value of missing bank balances by taking the diﬀerence between:
(a) the aggregate household deposits reported to the Swedish Central Bank, and (b) the
aggregate bank balances in our dataset. The implied average balance is then assigned
to each missing observation.
The second method uses the subsample of individuals (about 250,000) for which we
observe the bank account balance even though the earned interest is less than 100 SEK.
We regress the balance onto the following observable characteristics: age and squared
age of household head, household size, real estate wealth, level and squared level of
household disposable income, and ﬁnancial wealth other than bank accounts. The coef-
ﬁcient of determination is modest (R2 =1 .2%) but the regression coeﬃcients are highly
signiﬁcant. We use the regression to impute the account balances of individual house-
hold members and then aggregate the imputed amounts to infer the household bank
account balance. This method is used for computations involving complete portfolios in
Figure 5b and in Tables 2, 3, 7 − 9, 11 and 12. Robustness checks show that the choice
of the imputation method has very little impact on the results.
8.2. Dollar CAPM
We assume that assets are priced on world markets using the dollar CAPM. Returns in
the domestic currency (the Swedish krona) can then be derived in three steps.
Step 1. Dollar CAPM on world markets
Let r$
f,t denote the net simple return on the US T-bill, and r$
m,t the dollar return of
the market index. We assume for any asset j, the net return r$









where the residual u$
j,t has zero mean and is uncorrelated with the market index. This
relation is used to price ﬁnancial assets and portfolios worldwide.
Step 2. Exchange rate
Let Xt denote the value of one unit of domestic currency (Swedish krona) in US dollars,
and let xt denote the corresponding net return: xt = Xt/Xt−1 − 1.W e c o n s i d e r t h e
33investment strategy consisting of: (a) converting $1 into the domestic currency at date
t − 1; (b) investing the proceeds at the domestic riskless rate rD
f,t;a n d(c) converting
the investment back into US dollars at date t. The gross return on this investment is
(1 + xt)(1 + rD
f,t). The dollar CAPM implies
(1 + xt)(1 + rD
f,t) − (1 + r$
f,t)=( r$
m,t − r$
f,t)βx + vt, (8.2)
where the residual vt has zero correlation with the market excess return.
Step 3. Mean-variance frontier in local currency
From the perspective of a domestic (Swedish) investor, the excess return of an asset j







− (1 + rD
f,t).









where βj = β$
j − βx and uj,t = u$
j,t − vt. When the currency return xt exhibits modest
variations around its mean ¯ x, the domestic excess return is reasonably approximated by
[(r$
m,t −r$










j,t are rescaled versions of βj and uj,t. It is easy to check that under
covered interest parity, r$
m,t −r$
f,t is the excess return on a fully hedged portfolio of the
world index.21 From the perspective of a domestic investor, the global pricing model
thus induces a domestic version of the CAPM (8.3) in which the hedged world index
plays the role of the eﬃcient benchmark.
The dollar CAPM is implemented as follows:
1. We estimate the sample mean r$
m − r$
f and sample variance (σ$
m)2 of the world
index excess return series in dollars.
21If we buy a unit of the index and engage in a forward sale of the dollar, we obtain the gross return
(1+r
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342. For each asset j ∈ {1,..,N},w ee s t i m a t et h ed o m e s t i cb e t aβD
j by regressing the
asset’s domestic excess return reD
j,t onto the hedged world index r$
m,t − r$
f,t. We
then compute the N ×N variance-covariance matrix R of the regression residuals.
3. We ﬁnally infer the mean μj = r$
m − r$
f βD
j and variance-covariance matrix ΣD =
(σ$
m)2βDβD0 + R of domestic excess returns.
The market premium is the sample average over the 1983-2004 period (longest period
available). The beta coeﬃcient of each asset/mutual fund is computed using 1994-2004
monthly data (or the available subset for shorter-lived assets).
8 . 3 .F a m aa n dF r e n c hF a c t o r s








j,t (1 ≤ j ≤ N),
where re
m,t is the excess return of the dollar world index (relative to the US T-bill), and
SMBt and HMLt are the US size and value factors. As in Section 8.2, the global Fama
French model implies that domestic excess returns (in Swedish kronas relative to the




m,t + γjSMBt + δjHMLt + uj,t.
We implement the following estimation procedure:
• Let ft =( re
m,t,SMB t,HML t)0 denote the column vector of the three factors in
date t. We compute the sample mean ¯ f =
PT
t=1 ft/T and variance-covariance
matrix ΣF =
PT
t=1(ft −¯ f)(ft −¯ f)0/T.
• For each asset j, we estimate the loadings bj =( βj,γj,δj)0 by regressing the














• We then compute the mean domestic excess return μj = b0
j¯ f on every asset j.
The variance-covariance matrix of the assets is estimated by
Σ = BΣFB0 + D,
where B is the matrix of factor loadings (b1,...,bN)
0, and D is the diagonal matrix
with diagonal elements σ2
u,j.
358.4. Utility Loss
Consider a household with an inﬁnite horizon, CRRA utility of consumption with dis-
count factor δ and risk aversion γ, and able to invest in two assets: a safe asset with log
return rf, and a risky asset with log return rt+1 distributed i.i.d. normal, with mean μ
and variance σ2. We use uppercase letters for levels, and lowercase letters for logs.









Wt+1 =( Wt − Ct)(1 + Rp,t+1)
Rp,t+1 = Rf + w(Rt+1 − Rf).
The usual ﬁrst-order conditions apply:
γEt∆ct+1 =l n ( δ)+rf + γ2σ2
c/2,
where σ2
c is the variance of consumption, and
μ − rf + σ2/2=γσrc,
where σrc is the covariance of the risky asset return with consumption.
We use the continuous-time approximation to the log portfolio return, as in Campbell
and Viceira (2002). That is, we assume
rp,t+1 = rf + w(rt+1 − rf + σ2/2) − w2σ2/2.
We can show that the optimal consumption-wealth ratio Ct/Wt is a constant in this
example. It is convenient to use the notation x =l n ( 1− Ct/Wt), and use the budget
constraint to show that
∆ct+1 = ∆wt+1 = x + rp,t+1.
The random component of the portfolio return is just w times the risky asset return, so
the covariance of the risky asset return with consumption is given by
σrc = wσ2,
and the optimal portfolio share is the familiar
w =





where S is the Sharpe ratio of the risky asset.
36We can now substitute out the moments of consumption from the consumption
growth Euler equation:
γ(x + Etrp,t+1)=l n ( δ)+rf + γ2w2σ2/2.





















γ−1 , or in
logs,
vt =
γ ln(1 − ex) − ln(1 − δ)
γ − 1
.
Financial opportunities thus aﬀect the value function through x.
This gives us all the ingredients we need to analyze the welfare eﬀect of a change in
the Sharpe ratio from an ineﬃcient portfolio Sh to an eﬃcient one SB.T h e e ﬀect of






We note that this measure of ineﬃciency increases with the ineﬃciency measure S2
B−S2
h
and decreases with risk aversion γ.
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41TABLE 1. AGGREGATE WEALTH STATISTICS
31 December 2002
SCB Statistics Data Data Wealth Share Financial Share
Billion SEK Billion SEK Billion Dollars % %
Financial Assets
Bank Accounts 402 410.2 46.2 9.7% 35.1%
Money Market Funds 47 64.0 7.2 1.5% 5.5%
Mutual Funds 273 260.5 29.4 6.1% 22.3%
Domestic Stocks 260 244.2 27.5 5.7% 20.9%
International Stocks N/A 20.8 2.3 0.5% 1.8%
Capital Insurance 107 107.7 12.1 2.5% 9.2%
Bonds and Derivatives 76 61.1 6.9 1.4% 5.2%
Total Financial Assets 1,165 1,168.5 131.7 27.5% 100.0%
Real Estate
Residential 2,523 2,704.8 304.8 63.7%
Non-Residential 533 374.5 42.2 8.8%
Total Real Estate 3,056 3,079.3 347.0 72.5%
Total Gross Wealth 4,221 4,247.8 478.7 100.0%
Debt
Student Loans 146 148.4 16.7
Other Debt 1,177 1,162.9 131.1
Total Debt 1,323 1,311.2 147.8
Total Net Wealth 2,898 2,936.6 331.0
Number of households 4,869,448 4,869,448 4,869,448
Gross Wealth per Household SEK 866,833 SEK 872,342 $98,313
Net Wealth per Household SEK 595,139 SEK 603,070 $67,966TABLE 2. SUMMARY STATISTICS
This table reports summary statistics of the main financial and demographic characteristics of Swedish households at the end of 2002. All logarithms are in the natural base. 
The computations are based on the random sample of 100,000 households considered throughout the empirical analysis.
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev
Disposable Income ($ per year) 26,527 21,280 29,046 31,329 26,546 34,724 18,266 15,390 10,622
Financial Wealth ($) 29,180 7,191 197,304 41,586 14,563 246,730 7,834 1,262 21,190
Complete Portfolio ($)  −    −    −   35,553 12,467 232,120  −    −    −  
Risky Portfolio ($)  −    −    −   19,515 4,372 178,641  −    −    −  
Stock Portfolio ($)  −    −    −   9,261 229 157,324  −    −    −  
Real-Estate Wealth ($) 77,394 28,879 212,155 104,960 61,133 256,660 29,967 0 74,537
Total Liabilities ($) 33,050 10,011 124,799 41,434 17,113 100,748 18,626 3,524 156,780
Log of Financial Wealth 11.00 11.06 1.82 11.73 11.77 1.49 9.74 9.32 1.65
Log of Real-Estate Wealth 8.01 12.45 6.64 9.82 13.20 6.13 4.90 0.00 6.31
Age 51.71 50.00 18.22 50.94 50.00 17.07 53.03 51.00 19.98
High-School Dummy 0.66 1.00 0.48 0.72 1.00 0.45 0.55 1.00 0.50
Post High-School Dummy 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.32 0.00 0.46 0.16 0.00 0.37
M i s s i n g  E d u c a t i o n 0 . 1 50 . 0 00 . 3 60 . 1 20 . 0 00 . 3 20 . 2 10 . 0 00 . 4 1
I m m i g r a t i o n  D u m m y 0 . 1 50 . 0 00 . 3 50 . 1 10 . 0 00 . 3 10 . 2 10 . 0 00 . 4 1
Household Size 1.95 1.00 1.25 2.19 2.00 1.29 1.56 1.00 1.06
Retired Dummy 0.25 0.00 0.43 0.22 0.00 0.42 0.30 0.00 0.46
Unemployment Dummy 0.08 0.00 0.28 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.11 0.00 0.31
Entrepreneur Dummy 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.04 0.00 0.19 0.02 0.00 0.15
Student Dummy 0.04 0.00 0.20 0.04 0.00 0.19 0.05 0.00 0.22
Private Pension Premia/Income(%) 1.27 0.00 5.95 1.71 0.23 7.25 0.52 0.00 2.28
Log of Total Liabilities 8.40 11.39 5.67 9.01 11.93 5.60 7.35 10.35 5.62
    ALL HOUSEHOLDS   PARTICIPANTS       NONPARTICIPANTSTABLE 3. PARTICIPATION AND RISKY ASSET SHARE
The first set of three columns reports a probit regression of the participation decision on financial and demographic household characteristics. 
Participation is defined as the ownership of at least one risky asset, and disposable income is rescaled as a multiple of 100,000 SEK. The second 
set of columns reports an OLS regression of the participants’ risky share on the same set of observable characteristics. The risky share is defined 
as the weight of risky assets in the complete portfolio. For each regression, we report the linear coefficient, standard deviation and marginal effect 
of each predicting variable. The marginal effect is assessed by computing the impact on the dependent variable of increasing a continuous 
regressor by one standard deviation, or of setting a dummy variable equal to one. 
Estimate Std Error Change Estimate Std Error Change
Intercept -4.852 0.049  −   -0.037 0.013  −  
Disposable Income 0.106 0.007 8.8% -0.001 0.000 -0.5%
Log of Financial Wealth 0.491 0.004 22.9% 0.045 0.001 6.7%
Log of Real-Estate Wealth 0.021 0.001 4.6% 0.000 0.000 0.3%
Age -0.014 0.001 -9.8% 0.000 0.000 -0.2%
High-School Dummy 0.195 0.015 7.1% 0.021 0.004 2.1%
Post High-School Dummy 0.130 0.014 4.3% 0.033 0.003 3.3%
Missing Education -0.066 0.022 -2.3% 0.023 0.006 2.3%
Immigration Dummy -0.384 0.015 -14.4% -0.023 0.004 -2.3%
Household Size -0.009 0.006 -0.4% -0.033 0.001 -4.2%
Retired Dummy 0.137 0.023 4.6% -0.001 0.005 -0.1%
Unemployment Dummy -0.065 0.018 -2.3% -0.019 0.005 -1.9%
Entrepreneur Dummy -0.030 0.032 -1.0% -0.060 0.007 -6.0%
Student Dummy 0.028 0.026 1.0% 0.032 0.007 3.2%
Private Pension Premia/Income 3.053 0.218 6.1% 0.060 0.017 0.4%




Probit Regression           OLS Regression
    RISKY SHARE OF PARTICIPANTSTABLE 4. TOTAL VOLATILITY OF RISKY PORTFOLIO
The first two rows of each panel report the mean and standard deviation of portfolio characteristics in the population of participating households. In the next set of 
rows, households are sorted by Total Risk and the mean of the 100 households around the corresponding Total Risk percentile is reported. Excess risk is the 
standard deviation of the difference between the household risky portfolio return and the return of the value-weighted index of household risky portfolios.
A. Hedged World Index
B. Unhedged World Index










σh (%) |βh| σB (%) σi,h (%) (σi,h/σh)
2 (%) βh σ(rh - rpop) (%)
Mean 24.16 13.71 19.47 61.13 0.93 13.33
Std Dev 14.21 4.37 14.14 13.02 0.30 14.74
1st Percentile 10.98 7.76 7.77 50.06 0.53 9.19
5th Percentile 12.44 10.01 7.39 35.27 0.68 8.77
10th Percentile 14.60 9.89 10.59 53.15 0.67 7.85
25th Percentile 17.97 11.73 13.57 57.20 0.80 5.77
50th Percentile 20.73 13.57 15.57 56.72 0.92 7.34
75th Percentile 25.77 14.50 21.12 67.44 0.99 14.12
90th Percentile 36.95 16.08 33.27 81.07 1.09 30.65
95th Percentile 51.48 21.57 46.56 81.68 1.47 40.86
99th Percentile 69.56 27.20 63.55 83.37 1.85 60.02










σh (%) |βh| σB (%) σi,h (%) (σi,h/σh)
2 (%) βh σ(rh - rpop) (%)
Mean 24.16 15.52 17.80 49.57 0.97 13.33
Std Dev 14.21 4.69 14.36 17.10 0.29 14.74
1st Percentile 10.98 9.03 6.25 32.44 0.56 9.19
5th Percentile 12.44 11.00 5.81 21.77 0.69 8.77
10th Percentile 14.60 11.64 8.66 35.86 0.73 7.85
25th Percentile 17.97 13.98 11.22 39.29 0.88 5.77
50th Percentile 20.73 15.34 13.81 44.79 0.96 7.34
75th Percentile 25.77 16.47 19.59 58.27 1.03 14.12
90th Percentile 36.95 14.00 34.20 85.65 0.88 30.65
95th Percentile 51.48 24.86 44.84 75.83 1.56 40.86
99th Percentile 69.56 29.82 62.43 80.47 1.87 60.02TABLE 5. IDIOSYNCRATIC VOLATILITY OF RISKY PORTFOLIO
A. Equal Treatment of All Assets
B. Separate Treatment of Stocks and Mutual Funds
The first two rows of each panel report the mean and standard deviation of portfolio characteristics in the population of participating households. In the next set 
of rows, households are sorted by Total Risk and the mean of the 1000 households around the corresponding Total Risk percentile is reported.
Mean 18.63 22.21 0.58 0.27 0.30
Std Dev 13.78 15.00 0.31 0.16 0.38
1st Percentile 7.34 7.92 0.83 0.20 0.02
5th Percentile 8.20 8.85 0.86 0.18 0.02
10th Percentile 9.97 12.37 0.42 0.37 0.06
25th Percentile 12.50 16.34 0.35 0.35 0.10
50th Percentile 15.17 16.58 0.79 0.28 0.06
75th Percentile 19.78 27.81 0.36 0.21 0.58
90th Percentile 32.01 36.89 0.68 0.14 0.88
95th Percentile 44.19 49.56 0.72 0.08 0.91
99th Percentile 60.05 72.59 0.70 0.12 0.83
Stock Share       
Dh
Idiosyncratic Risk  
σi,h (%)        
Asset Volatility     
σa,h (%)
Concentration      
Ca,h
Asset Correlation   
ρa,h
Mean 22.34 0.51 40.06 0.69 0.06
Std Dev 16.75 0.38 20.96 0.31 0.08
1st Percentile 8.13 0.08 33.85 0.87 0.01
5th Percentile 10.28 0.14 34.66 0.74 0.03
10th Percentile 11.55 0.16 35.14 0.71 0.03
25th Percentile 13.72 0.22 36.83 0.63 0.05
50th Percentile 17.21 0.45 39.52 0.55 0.08
75th Percentile 25.60 0.78 40.45 0.57 0.10
90th Percentile 39.81 0.89 50.26 0.72 0.08
95th Percentile 47.88 1.00 47.88 1.00 0.00
99th Percentile 84.74 0.95 94.14 0.83 0.08
Stock Correlation   
ρs,h
Idiosyncratic Risk  
σi,h (%)     
Stock Share       
Dh
Stock Volatility     
σs,h (%)
Concentration      
Cs,hTABLE 6. ASSETS MOST WIDELY HELD BY HOUSEHOLDS
A. Stocks
B. Risky Mutual Funds













Ericsson B 1,977 8.6% 44.5% 18.9% 5.2% 23.2%
AstraZeneca 1,467 6.4% 7.7% 10.3% 7.1% 5.5%
Hennes & Mauritz B 1,144 5.0% 9.7% 8.3% 6.9% 14.0%
SHB A 1,022 4.4% 3.9% 12.0% 4.2% 18.9%
Nokia 976 4.2% 7.9% 33.9% 1.4% 17.5%
SEB A 916 4.0% 15.8% 16.6% 2.7% 15.9%
Pharmacia Corporation SDB                640 2.8% 8.1% 38.0% 0.8% 10.1%
Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget 619 2.7% 3.2% 9.8% 3.1% 15.3%
FöreningsSparbanken A 613 2.7% 19.0% 10.0% 3.0% 27.6%
TeliaSonera 604 2.6% 36.8% 3.6% 8.4% 21.7%










FSB/Robur Kapitalinvest FSB Capital Invest 1,911 5.2% 22.4% 29.2%
Nordea Futura Nordea Futura 1,246 3.4% 8.5% 29.2%
FSB/Robur Allemansfond III (ny) FSB Every man 1,110 3.0% 9.7% 31.7%
FSB/Robur Mixfond FSB Mixed 982 2.7% 9.6% 32.0%
FSB/Robur Allemansfond IV (ny) FSB Every man 904 2.5% 6.5% 30.7%
SHB Sverige/Världen SHB Sweden/ World 787 2.2% 4.5% 36.4%
Nordea Beta Nordea Beta 786 2.2% 5.3% 27.2%
SEB Sverige I SEB Sweden 684 1.9% 4.3% 29.4%
FSB/Robur Allemansfond II FSB Every man 632 1.7% 3.3% 28.6%
SEB Aktiesparfond SEB Equity saving 627 1.7% 5.3% 30.0%TABLE 6. ASSETS MOST WIDELY HELD BY HOUSEHOLDS (cont.)
C. Composition of Risky Mutual Funds
Panel A reports the ten stocks that are most widely held by Swedish households. Stocks are sorted by the aggregate value of direct stockholdings (column 1). The following 
columns report: the company’s weight in the aggregate value of direct stockholdings; the fraction of direct investors who own at least one share of the company; the fraction of the 
company’s market capitalization that is directly held by households; the company’s value-weighted share of the Swedish stockmarket; and the stock Sharpe’s ratio estimated with 
the Dollar CAPM. Panel B similarly lists the risky mutual funds with the highest aggregate value in household portfolios. For each fund, we report (1) the managing firm; (2) the 
English translation of the fund’s name; (3) the value of household investments in the fund; (4) its share of aggregate household investments in risky funds; (5) the fraction of 
households owning the fund among the population of households investing in risky funds; and (6) the fund’s Sharpe ratio. The asset allocation of each fund at the end of 2002 is 
reported in Table C.









Cash (%) Futures (%)
FSB/Robur Kapitalinvest Capital Invest 45.0 0.0 54.1 0.0 0.9 0.0
Nordea Futura Futura 22.5 27.5 16.7 33.3 0.0 0.0
FSB/Robur Allemansfond III (ny) Every man 60.0 0.0 38.6 0.0 1.4 0.0
FSB/Robur Mixfond Mixed 22.9 22.1 29.1 17.1 8.8 0.0
FSB/Robur Allemansfond IV (ny) Every man 60.0 0.0 38.9 0.0 1.1 0.0
SHB Sverige/Världen Sweden/ World 72.7 0.0 25.4 0.0 1.9 0.0
Nordea Beta Beta 75.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SEB Sverige I Sweden 93.9 0.2 0.0 0.0 5.9 0.0
FSB/Robur Allemansfond II Every man 60.0 0.0 38.8 0.0 1.2 0.0
SEB Aktiesparfond Equity saving 47.6 3.8 39.5 0.0 9.6 -0.5TABLE 7. RELATIVE SHARPE RATIO LOSS
The table reports the cross sectional distribution of relative Sharpe ratio losses on the complete and stock portfolios. The mean and standard 
deviation of asset returns are computed using two pricing models: the CAPM and the Fama-French three factor model. The market portfolio is 
proxied by the dollar-denominated World Index. Each set of two columns reports yearly household losses relative to a specific benchmark under 
the two models.  We consider four benchmarks: (1) the MSCI World Index in US dollars; (2) the World Index in Swedish kronas; (3) the MSCI
Swedish Index in Swedish kronas; and (4) the highest Sharpe ratio achieved by a household complete portfolio in the sample. 
Benchmark
S p e c i f i c a t i o n C A P MF F C A P MF F C A P MF F C A P MF F
Sharpe Ratio (%) 45.23 45.23 34.56 35.97 27.44 31.00 40.56 45.45
Mean 0.38 0.35 0.19 0.18 -0.02 0.05 0.31 0.35
Std Dev 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.22 0.16 0.15
25th Percentile 0.29 0.25 0.07 0.06 -0.16 -0.09 0.21 0.26
50th Percentile 0.35 0.32 0.14 0.14 -0.08 0.00 0.27 0.32
75th Percentile 0.42 0.40 0.24 0.25 0.04 0.13 0.35 0.41
90th Percentile 0.55 0.53 0.41 0.41 0.26 0.31 0.50 0.53
95th Percentile 0.69 0.68 0.60 0.60 0.49 0.54 0.66 0.69
99th Percentile 0.89 0.89 0.85 0.86 0.82 0.84 0.88 0.89
Mean 0.52 0.48 0.37 0.34 0.21 0.24 0.47 0.48
Std Dev 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.24 0.15 0.16
25th Percentile 0.42 0.40 0.25 0.24 0.05 0.12 0.36 0.40
50th Percentile 0.51 0.47 0.35 0.34 0.19 0.23 0.45 0.48
75th Percentile 0.58 0.54 0.45 0.42 0.31 0.33 0.53 0.54
90th Percentile 0.69 0.69 0.60 0.61 0.49 0.55 0.66 0.69
95th Percentile 0.77 0.77 0.70 0.71 0.62 0.66 0.74 0.77
99th Percentile 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.90 0.93 0.93
Complete Portfolios
Stock Portfolios
World Index in USD World Index in SEK Swedish Index in SEK Maximal Sharpe RatioTABLE 8. RETURN LOSS
Panel A reports the return loss on the complete and risky portfolios as a fraction of complete portfolio wealth. The computations are based on two 
asset pricing models: the CAPM and the three-factor Fama-French model; the market portfolio is proxied by the dollar-denominated World Index. 
Each set of two columns reports the cross-sectional distribution of household losses relative to a benchmark. 
A. Loss as a Fraction of Financial Wealth
Benchmark
Specification CAPM FF CAPM FF CAPM FF CAPM FF
Sharpe Ratio (%) 45.23 45.23 34.56 35.97 27.44 31.00 40.56 45.45
Mean 1.68 1.54 0.66 0.66 -0.01 0.20 1.23 1.56
Std Dev 2.10 2.05 1.32 1.39 0.94 1.11 1.74 2.06
25th Percentile 0.54 0.48 0.09 0.07 -0.36 -0.17 0.36 0.49
50th Percentile 1.17 1.04 0.30 0.29 -0.11 0.00 0.79 1.06
75th Percentile 2.06 1.83 0.71 0.72 0.05 0.22 1.45 1.86
90th Percentile 3.40 3.12 1.58 1.57 0.61 0.89 2.58 3.16
95th Percentile 5.04 4.71 2.65 2.69 1.17 1.68 3.97 4.76
99th Percentile 9.86 9.58 5.84 6.10 3.28 4.28 8.06 9.67
Mean 4.14 3.83 1.75 1.78 0.16 0.67 3.09 3.88
Std Dev 4.91 4.97 3.53 3.79 2.70 3.20 4.29 5.00
25th Percentile 2.01 1.81 0.40 0.34 -0.82 -0.49 1.31 1.84
50th Percentile 2.92 2.55 0.87 0.86 -0.39 0.02 1.97 2.59
75th Percentile 4.21 3.84 1.73 1.72 0.22 0.81 3.13 3.89
90th Percentile 8.51 7.75 4.61 4.50 1.93 2.87 6.82 7.83
95th Percentile 12.16 11.86 7.07 6.91 3.20 4.65 9.92 11.97
99th Percentile 17.91 17.86 11.25 12.08 7.52 8.98 14.81 18.00
Complete Portfolio Return Loss (%)
Risky Portfolio Return Loss (%)
World Index in USD World Index in SEK Swedish Index in SEK Maximal Sharpe RatioTABLE 8. RETURN LOSS (cont.)
B. Rescaled Measures
Panel B reports two rescaled measures of household losses: (1) the dollar loss is obtained by multiplying the return loss on the risky (or complete) 
portfolio considered in Panel A by the dollar value of the risky (complete) portfolio; (2) the loss as a fraction of disposable income is obtained by 
dividing the dollar loss by the three-year average of household disposable income. The standard deviation of dollar losses is computed by 
winsorizing the top 0.1% of the sample.
Benchmark
Specification CAPM FF CAPM FF CAPM FF CAPM FF
Mean 740 638 321 278 43 85 557 646
Std Dev 2,243 1,954 1,127 1,342 768 1,648 1,756 1,978
25th Percentile 36 33 6 5 -55 -21 24 33
50th Percentile 131 118 33 30 -8 0 91 120
75th Percentile 433 383 133 121 4 24 302 389
90th Percentile 1,190 1,039 426 388 78 138 847 1,056
95th Percentile 2,204 1,922 851 762 218 324 1,609 1,952
99th Percentile 7,565 6,341 3,244 2,892 1,129 1,521 5,640 6,429
Mean 2.13 1.88 0.86 0.79 0.02 0.20 1.58 1.91
Std Dev 9.64 9.07 5.34 5.48 3.19 3.95 7.70 9.16
25th Percentile 0.14 0.13 0.02 0.02 -0.20 -0.08 0.10 0.13
50th Percentile 0.51 0.46 0.13 0.12 -0.03 0.00 0.35 0.46
75th Percentile 1.64 1.45 0.52 0.48 0.02 0.10 1.16 1.47
90th Percentile 4.48 3.94 1.62 1.53 0.32 0.57 3.21 4.00
95th Percentile 7.84 6.85 3.13 2.92 0.89 1.33 5.72 6.95
99th Percentile 23.99 20.82 11.40 10.18 4.48 5.60 18.48 21.14
Return Loss in Dollars
Return Loss as a Fraction of Disposable Income (%)
World Index in USD World Index in SEK Swedish Index in SEK Maximal Sharpe RatioTABLE 9. UTILITY LOSS
The table reports utility losses as a fraction of complete portfolio wealth, utility losses in dollars, and utility losses as a fraction of disposable 
income. A three-year average is used for disposable income to smooth out transitory variations. The standard deviation of utility losses (as a 
fraction of wealth) and dollar losses are computed by winsorizing the top 0.1% of the sample.
Benchmark
Specification CAPM FF CAPM FF CAPM FF CAPM FF
Sharpe Ratio (%) 45.23 45.23 34.56 35.97 27.44 31.00 40.56 45.45
Mean 2.62 2.36 0.98 0.99 0.14 0.38 1.85 2.39
Std Dev 4.30 4.22 2.33 2.52 1.40 1.82 3.36 4.26
25th Percentile 0.70 0.61 0.10 0.08 -0.33 -0.17 0.43 0.62
50th Percentile 1.52 1.32 0.34 0.32 -0.10 0.00 0.96 1.34
75th Percentile 2.79 2.43 0.84 0.86 0.06 0.25 1.86 2.48
90th Percentile 5.27 4.70 2.26 2.24 0.81 1.21 3.85 4.77
95th Percentile 8.25 7.46 3.90 3.94 1.77 2.41 6.21 7.56
99th Percentile 18.09 17.40 9.18 9.68 4.90 6.37 13.87 17.59
Mean 1,204 1,006 487 430 116 175 867 1,021
Std Dev 3,766 3,175 1,645 1,711 882 1,592 2,727 3,227
25th Percentile 47 43 7 5 -52 -20 31 44
50th Percentile 178 155 38 35 -8 0 114 158
75th Percentile 596 513 162 147 5 28 394 522
90th Percentile 1,664 1,428 552 500 102 178 1,137 1,453
95th Percentile 3,146 2,685 1,119 1,013 300 446 2,184 2,732
99th Percentile 11,020 9,048 4,452 4,043 1,575 2,157 7,918 9,176
Mean 3.36 2.86 1.28 1.17 0.21 0.42 2.38 2.91
Std Dev 20.96 18.61 11.05 10.69 6.36 7.42 16.24 18.83
25th Percentile 0.19 0.17 0.03 0.02 -0.19 -0.07 0.12 0.17
50th Percentile 0.68 0.59 0.15 0.13 -0.03 0.00 0.44 0.60
75th Percentile 2.28 1.95 0.63 0.58 0.02 0.11 1.51 1.99
90th Percentile 6.44 5.52 2.10 1.99 0.41 0.73 4.39 5.62
95th Percentile 11.57 9.90 4.31 3.96 1.27 1.84 8.14 10.06
99th Percentile 39.07 32.46 16.60 15.28 6.96 8.84 28.25 32.94
Utility Loss as a Fraction of Wealth (%)
Utility Loss in Dollars
Utility Loss as a Fraction of Disposable Income (%)
World Index in USD World Index in SEK  Swedish Index in SEK Max Sharpe RatioTABLE 10. CROSS-SECTIONAL DECOMPOSITION OF COMPLETE RETURN LOSS
A. Losses Relative to Hedged World Index
B. Losses Relative to Unhedged World Index
The table reports the cross-sectional decomposition of return losses on the complete portfolio. The diversification loss is 
computed by winsorizing the top 0.1% of the sample.




RLcomplete,h (%) wh βh RSRLh/(1-RSRLh)
Mean 1.68 0.45 0.90 0.78
Std Dev 2.10 0.30 0.38 10.89
1st Percentile 0.01 0.01 0.88 0.72
5th Percentile 0.09 0.03 0.90 0.95
10th Percentile 0.19 0.08 0.90 0.93
25th Percentile 0.54 0.25 0.84 0.69
50th Percentile 1.17 0.49 0.82 0.98
75th Percentile 2.06 0.70 0.89 0.59
90th Percentile 3.40 0.71 0.97 1.02
95th Percentile 5.04 0.71 1.15 1.44
99th Percentile 9.86 0.77 1.46 1.96




RLcomplete,h (%) wh βh RSRLh/(1-RSRLh)
Mean 0.66 0.45 0.90 0.36
Std Dev 1.32 0.30 0.38 8.32
1st Percentile -0.24 0.60 1.15 -0.06
5th Percentile -0.04 0.33 0.99 -0.03
10th Percentile 0.00 0.08 0.86 0.57
25th Percentile 0.09 0.20 0.87 0.14
50th Percentile 0.30 0.43 0.84 0.36
75th Percentile 0.71 0.64 0.87 0.48
90th Percentile 1.58 0.54 1.17 0.57
95th Percentile 2.65 0.66 1.13 0.57
99th Percentile 5.84 0.78 1.32 1.10TABLE 11. CONTRIBUTORS TO COMPLETE RETURN LOSS
This table reports a probit regression of the complete return loss and its three components on observable household characteristics. Losses are computed relative to the hedged 
world index. Since ln(RLcomplete,h) = ln(wh) + ln|βh|+ln|RSRLh/(1-RSRLh)|, the estimate for the complete loss is the sum of the three other estimates. 
Estimate Std Err Change Estimate Std Err Change Estimate Std Err Change Estimate Std Err Change
Intercept -1.093 0.055  −   -2.752 0.053  −   -0.108 0.027  −   -0.127 0.030  −  
Disposable Income 0.007 0.002 2.1% -0.007 0.002 -2.1% 0.009 0.001 2.7% 0.005 0.001 1.5%
Log of Financial Wealth 0.090 0.004 14.1% 0.137 0.004 22.3% -0.016 0.002 -2.2% -0.032 0.002 -4.5%
Log of Real-Estate Wealth 0.008 0.001 5.1% 0.005 0.001 3.2% 0.003 0.001 2.1% 0.000 0.001 -0.3%
Age -0.001 0.001 -1.9% -0.001 0.001 -1.9% -0.002 0.000 -3.7% 0.002 0.000 3.8%
High-School Dummy 0.111 0.016 10.5% 0.107 0.016 10.2% 0.057 0.008 5.6% -0.053 0.009 -5.5%
Post High-School Dummy 0.173 0.013 18.9% 0.124 0.013 13.2% 0.042 0.007 4.3% 0.006 0.007 0.6%
Missing Education 0.112 0.024 11.9% 0.087 0.024 9.1% -0.037 0.012 -3.7% 0.063 0.013 6.5%
Immigration Dummy 0.043 0.017 4.4% -0.112 0.017 -10.6% 0.045 0.009 4.6% 0.110 0.009 11.6%
Household Size -0.143 0.005 -16.9% -0.086 0.005 -10.5% -0.010 0.002 -1.3% -0.047 0.003 -5.9%
Retired Dummy -0.043 0.022 -4.2% -0.023 0.021 -2.3% -0.050 0.011 -4.9% 0.031 0.012 3.1%
Unemployment Dummy -0.086 0.021 -8.2% -0.105 0.021 -9.9% -0.001 0.011 -0.1% 0.020 0.012 2.0%
Entrepreneur Dummy -0.115 0.029 -10.8% -0.261 0.028 -22.9% 0.097 0.014 10.2% 0.049 0.016 5.0%
Student Dummy 0.020 0.031 2.0% 0.069 0.030 7.1% -0.053 0.015 -5.2% 0.004 0.017 0.4%
Private Pension Premia/Income 0.248 0.074 1.8% 0.352 0.071 2.6% -0.016 0.037 -0.1% -0.087 0.040 -0.6%
Log of Total Liabilities 0.012 0.001 7.0% 0.004 0.001 2.3% 0.010 0.001 5.6% -0.002 0.001 -0.9%
Adjusted R
2 0.034 0.039 0.050 0.030
Risky Share             
ln(wh)
Risky Portfolio Beta      
ln|βh|
Diversification Loss      
ln| RSRLh/(1-RSRLh) |
Return Loss             
ln(RLcomplete,h)TABLE 12. IDIOSYNCRATIC VOLATILITY AND HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS
The first set of column reports the results of an OLS regression of the idiosyncratic volatility of the risky portfolio (relative to the hedged world index) onto demographic and 
financial household characteristics. The second set of columns reports a probit regression of direct investment in individual stocks. The next three set of columns reports 
OLS regressions of the following dependent variables: the average idiosyncratic volatility of individual assets (identical treatment in the terminology of Section 4.2); the share 
of direct stockholdings in the risky portfolio; and the average idiosyncratic volatility of individual stocks.  Disposable income is rescaled as a multiple of 100,000 SEK. 
Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err
Intercept 26.470 0.912 -3.675 0.062 14.858 0.995 1.122 0.031 61.319 1.902
Disposable Income 0.198 0.024 0.096 0.005 0.266 0.026 0.008 0.001 0.167 0.039
Log of Financial Wealth -0.881 0.061 0.295 0.005 0.304 0.067 -0.057 0.002 -1.470 0.123
Log of Real-Estate Wealth -0.012 0.015 0.014 0.001 -0.001 0.017 -0.003 0.001 -0.155 0.034
Age -0.008 0.008 0.003 0.001 -0.021 0.008 0.001 0.000 -0.206 0.016
High-School Dummy -0.459 0.218 0.022 0.017 -0.102 0.237 -0.027 0.007 1.371 0.450
Post High-School Dummy 0.496 0.164 0.122 0.014 1.001 0.179 0.008 0.005 -0.178 0.328
Missing Education 0.612 0.494 -0.133 0.027 0.702 0.538 0.019 0.015 3.422 0.947
Immigration Dummy 3.246 0.226 0.119 0.019 3.462 0.246 0.105 0.007 3.090 0.456
Household Size -1.154 0.060 -0.134 0.006 -1.567 0.066 -0.046 0.002 -0.479 0.124
Retired Dummy -0.228 0.329 -0.030 0.025 -0.385 0.359 0.010 0.010 0.973 0.623
Unemployment Dummy 0.368 0.273 0.003 0.023 0.347 0.298 0.042 0.010 0.152 0.614
Entrepreneur Dummy 2.649 0.379 0.366 0.033 2.992 0.413 0.097 0.011 0.253 0.694
Student Dummy -0.741 0.371 -0.017 0.033 -1.134 0.404 0.001 0.014 -1.360 0.877
Private Pension Premia/ Income -6.378 2.021 0.000 0.072 -5.085 2.204 -0.421 0.060 0.471 3.704
Log of Total Liabilities 0.423 0.049 0.018 0.001 0.628 0.054 0.009 0.002 0.677 0.096
Adjusted R
2 0.025 0.024 0.096 0.036
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility of 
Individual Assets  
σa,h (%)
Share of Direct 
Stockholdings in 







Volatility of Risky 
Portfolio          
σi,h (%)       
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility of 
Individual Stocks  
σs,h (%)TABLE 13. PREDICTORS OF EXTREME PORTFOLIO CHARACTERISTICS
This table reports probit regressions that a household portfolio is in the top 5% in terms of: (1) return losses (2) beta of complete portfolio; and (3) the diversification loss RSRLh/(1-
RSRLh). Disposable income is rescaled as a multiple of 100,000 SEK. For each probit, we report the regression coefficient, standard deviation and marginal effect of each predicting 
variable. The marginal effect is assessed by computing the impact on the dependent variable of increasing a continuous regressor by one standard deviation, or of setting a dummy 
variable equal to one. 
Estimate Std Err Change Estimate Std Err Change Estimate Std Err Change
Intercept -1.331 0.092  −   -2.051 0.094  −   -0.391 0.093  −  
Disposable Income 0.014 0.002 0.4% 0.010 0.002 0.3% 0.002 0.004 0.1%
Log of Financial Wealth -0.004 0.008 -0.1% 0.059 0.008 0.8% -0.108 0.008 -1.1%
Log of Real-Estate Wealth 0.000 0.002 0.0% 0.003 0.002 0.2% -0.004 0.002 -0.2%
Age -0.004 0.001 -0.5% -0.006 0.001 -0.9% 0.007 0.001 1.1%
High-School Dummy 0.024 0.029 0.2% 0.106 0.030 0.9% -0.164 0.027 -1.6%
Post High-School Dummy 0.097 0.022 0.9% 0.078 0.022 0.8% -0.060 0.025 -0.5%
Missing Education 0.089 0.047 0.8% 0.058 0.050 0.5% 0.020 0.036 0.2%
Immigration Dummy 0.336 0.027 3.8% 0.280 0.027 3.2% 0.180 0.028 1.8%
Household Size -0.192 0.009 -1.7% -0.203 0.009 -1.9% -0.072 0.010 -0.7%
Retired Dummy -0.085 0.040 -0.7% -0.078 0.040 -0.6% 0.031 0.037 0.3%
Unemployment Dummy 0.059 0.035 0.5% 0.051 0.035 0.5% 0.019 0.037 0.2%
Entrepreneur Dummy 0.161 0.048 1.6% 0.131 0.047 1.3% 0.032 0.051 0.3%
Student Dummy -0.072 0.048 -0.6% -0.133 0.049 -1.1% 0.094 0.054 0.9%
Private Pension Premia/ Income -0.638 0.303 -0.4% -0.170 0.251 -0.1% -1.231 0.369 -0.7%




Return Loss         
RLcomplete,h (%)
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Gross WealthFIGURE 2. COMPOSITION OF FINANCIAL AND REAL ESTATE PORTFOLIO
























































OthersA. Variation with Gross Wealth
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